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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this project is to identify and trace the impact of conservative 
evangelicals' conception of "truth" upon their political tendencies and rhetoric 
through the early 1980s. The first chapter of this thesis relies upon several 
significant works of scholarship on the roots and coalescence of the religious 
Right in order to craft one potential genealogy of conservative evangelicals' 
unique and uniquely confident assumption that economic libertarianism and 
social conservatism - the distinct threads that combined to mark the "New 
Right" - represented both the "American way" and "God's way" at one and the 
same time. I argue that historical precedents and regional contexts combined 
with this increasingly-coherent political bloc's evangelical religion to bestow 
upon their political stances the appearance of incontestable, universally 
beneficent absolute truth. In the second chapter, I conduct a close reading of a 
book published in 1985 by a Texas couple who were influential in altering 
public school textbooks to reflect religious Right ideals. I do so in order to 
locate one cause of the appearance of "talking past each other" (an effect that 
consistently characterized rhetorical engagements between those on the 
religious Right and their opponents) in the authors' conservative evangelical 
conception of "truth." Together, these two papers highlight some of the 
problems arising from the common assumption that religion and theology are 
extricable from politics. Finally, the essays contained in this thesis point to 
ways in which accounting for the theology of particular religious groups can 
contribute to a fuller understanding of those groups, their development, and 
their social and historical impact.
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Preface
“Reagan’s overwhelming victory” in 1980, claims Bethany Moreton in To 
Serve God and Weil-Mart: The Making of Christian Free Enterprise, “and the 
growth of his evangelical base forced a sea change in the political and cultural 
landscape, moving the right from marginal fringe to controlling center.”1 However 
many scholars debate the extent to which the “right” ever qualified as a “marginal 
fringe,” a great number of scholars of twentieth century conservatism have, like 
Moreton, accepted the 1980 presidential election’s significance as axiomatic. The 
date continues to function either as a marker for a “sea change” in American 
political and social history, as Moreton puts it, or as a symbolic point of departure 
for investigating the causes and effects of that change. The explanations for the 
broad cultural and political shifts that occurred as part of the “Reagan Era” have 
become more complicated over time. The floods of initial and somewhat- 
panicked cries of localized right-wing conspiracies have largely given way to the 
assertion more common today, that (as Moreton herself argues) whatever the 
degree of conservative political organization that existed at the dawn of the 
decade, all that 1980 symbolizes was in actuality a long time in coming.
In the first half of this thesis, I review several monographs that trace a 
variety of quite complicated pasts behind the conservative resurgence in the 
1980s. The works I include contribute, at least in part, to an explanation of the 
origins and successes of the political phenomenon now labeled the “religious
1 Bethany Moreton, To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of Christian 
Free Enterprise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 4.
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Right” (which many in 1980 did not yet distinguish from the broader “New Right”), 
and that phenomenon’s largest demographic -  conservative evangelicals. My 
goal in examining this literature is to propose one possible genealogy of the 
fusion of evangelical religion, conservative politics, and nationalism that marked 
1980 as a point of departure from the more liberal trends of prior decades. More 
specifically, I aim to highlight some of the factors that played a key part in 
normalizing that fusion within conservative evangelical communities themselves.
I suggest that recent scholarship on the religious Right points towards the ways 
in which conservative evangelicals from the early part of the twentieth century to 
the early 1980s internalized particular economic and social ideas, conflating both 
those ideas and their religious beliefs with their own American “imagined 
community.”2 My literature review affirms the notion that conservative 
evangelicals within the religious Right demonstrate a conundrum unique to the 
American experience, in part because of the common and peculiarly American 
assumption that an individual’s “religion” can and ought to exist as a distinct and 
more importantly discreet entity, but also because of the way in which 
conservative evangelicals and their predecessors have historically tended to act 
in direct opposition to that assumption. Indeed, as the books reviewed highlight,
2 1 borrow here from Benedict Anderson’s terminology. The nation, 
according to Anderson, is “an imagined political community... It is imagined 
because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their 
fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives 
the image of their communion... Finally, it is imagined as a community, because, 
regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the 
nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.” Imagined 
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 3rd ed. (New 
York: Verso, 2006), 6-7.
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conservative evangelicals have tended to bestow upon their political ideals and 
their nationalistic fervor the weight of their belief, rooted in their evangelical faith, 
in their possession of absolute truth.
The second portion of this thesis centers on a 1985 book, What Are They 
Teaching Our Children?, written by Mel and Norma Gabler, a Texas couple 
passionate about correcting what they perceived to be the tragic disintegration of 
a “Christian America,” disintegration resulting from what they strongly felt were 
immoral public school textbooks. I rely heavily on the literary technique of close 
reading to conduct an examination of their rhetoric. I do this to explore the ways 
in which an examination of that rhetoric contributes toward a deeper 
understanding of the reasons why the appearance of talking past one another 
characterizes much of the political debate surrounding and involving conservative 
evangelicals in the 1980s and onward. In light of the history of insisting upon a 
separation of church affairs from state ones (however incompletely that ideal has 
ever been enacted), and in part because of the nature of debate (meaning, at its 
most broad, communication intended to persuade), the Gablers’ work can be 
read as an effort to “translate” the concerns of deeply-religious people into terms 
that could be persuasive both to those who shared the Gablers’ faith and to those 
who did not. On a rhetorical level, at least, their attempt singularly fails. Their 
attempts to use what Jurgen Habermas has called “generically accessible 
language” merely masks the fact that they are not interested in crafting
3
“generically accessible” presuppositions.3 Thus, while they frequently argue in 
terms that appear “generically accessible,” their foundational premises, rooted in 
the conservative evangelical theological tradition, remain largely 
unacknowledged. The effect is a work that, to all but those who share that 
theological tradition, appears incoherent and self-contradictory.
This project as a whole then reinforces the now-prevalent observation that 
the separation of religion from state processes and institutions -  the supposed 
division between “church and state” -  has been throughout United States history 
a mostly rhetorical dualism, a distinction that has in fact rarely (if ever) been 
lived.4 Indeed, as Sarah Rivett eloquently and persuasively argues in The 
Science of the Soul in Colonial New England, the wide acceptance of a “natural” 
separation between religious and empirical ways of knowing is a recent 
development.5 As law and religion scholar Winnifred Sullivan points out in The 
Impossibility of Religious Freedom, this epistemological division occurred in
3 Jurgen Habermas, “The Political’: The Rational Meaning of a 
Questionable Inheritance of Political Theology,” in The Power of Religion in the 
Public Sphere, ed. Eduardo Mendieta and Jonathan VanAntwerpen (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2011), 26.
4 See Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2002), for one example. Hamburger suggests that 
“separation of church and state” was an ideal crafted retrospectively and not, as 
is so often assumed, embedded in the U.S. Constitution.
5 Indeed, Rivett argues that through the mid-eighteenth century, the notion 
that there was or ought to be a distinction between scientific and spiritual 
knowledge was not at all widely accepted. “Inductive reasoning,” Rivett writes, 
“recourse to discoveries, the compilation of data, and the testing of a scientific 
theory through experiment were among the new measurements applied to 
metaphysics and spiritual study,” in the Puritans’ hunt for “evidence of God on 
human souls.” Sarah Rivett, The Science of the Soul in Colonial New England 
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 5.
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conjunction with “religious freedom and the legal disestablishment of religion, as 
political ideas, [which] find their origin in the early modern period of Europe.”6 
The attempts throughout United States history to compartmentalize religion (or at 
least, non-dominant religion), however, have created perpetual problems, not the 
least of which is the problem of defining religion. As Sullivan argues, “in order to 
enforce laws guaranteeing religious freedom you must first have religion.”7 
“Defining religion,” however, “is very difficult,” something Sullivan argues law 
really cannot do without undermining the very religious freedom it ostensibly 
protects.8 As she observes and as my examination of current scholarship affirms, 
“Ordinary religion, that is, the disestablished religion of ordinary people, fits 
uneasily into the spaces allowed for religion in the public square and in the 
courtroom.”9
Sullivan argues that “the precondition for political participation by religion 
increasingly became cooperation with liberal theories and forms of 
governance.”10 The problem lies in the fact that such cooperation necessarily 
requires “religion” be subordinate or adaptable to the values liberal government 
requires, terms unacceptable to those whose religious beliefs must by their very 
definition take priority over and inform all other demands. Furthermore, by the 
1980s, the “theories and forms of governance” in the United States had shifted
6 Winnifred Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2007), 7.
7 Ibid., 1.
8 Ibid., 1.
9 Ibid., 138.
10 Ibid., 7.
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toward an increased acceptance of many forms of diversity. Furthermore, many 
citizens, including leaders in public education and national media outlets, 
affirmed the idea that a pluralistic society is a positive good. As Giovanni Sartori 
argues persuasively, however, that presumption is itself a “value-belief.”11 “That 
difference (and .not uniformity), dissent (and not unanimity), change (and not 
immutability) are ‘good things,’” Sartori explains, “-these are the value-beliefs 
that properly belong to the cultural context of pluralism and that a pluralistic 
culture should convey in order to be true to its name.”12 Many conservative 
evangelicals on the religious Right were like the Gablers -  eager to participate in 
the political process but finding the growing emphasis on “pluralism” antithetical 
to their deepest moral instincts. Sartori claims that “pluralism... cannot be said to 
exist until the realm of God and the realm of Caesar are divided. This entails that 
no total claim is legitimate,” or, I would qualify, can at least be legitimately 
imposed upon a non-consenting population.13 What the Gablers’ rhetoric 
suggests first is that this Texas couple was quite aware that they lived in a 
diverse society whose members were likely to take issue not merely with their 
specific aims but with their core premises. The Gablers’ recognition of the 
existence of diversity seems to have compelled them to attempt to communicate 
their agenda in terms that would not appear religiously partisan. The problem lay 
in the fact that the terminology did not alter the Gablers’ driving presuppositions,
11 Giovanni Sartori, "Understanding Pluralism." Journal of Democracy 8. 
no. 4 (1997): 62, http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.wm.edu/journals/journal_of 
_democracy/v008/8.4sartori.html (accessed June 26, 2013).
12 Ibid., 62.
13 Ibid., 63.
6
assumptions rooted in their unique worldview and which were in direct conflict 
with the notion upon which the peaceful perpetuation of a pluralistic society rests 
-  that “no total claim is legitimate.” This notion was for the Gablers and numerous 
others on the religious Right untenable, for one of the beliefs most basic to the 
conservative evangelical tradition is the assertion that there is one true, totalizing 
metanarrative, and it is in believers’ possession.
As noted earlier, Jurgen Habermas suggests that “religious language” 
ought to be allowed “in the public sphere,” but citizens who choose to use that 
religious language “have to accept that the potential truth contents of religious 
utterances must be translated into a generically accessible language before they 
can find their way onto the agendas of parliaments, courts, or administrative 
bodies and influence their decisions.”14 What I argue throughout my work on the 
Gablers is that this “translation” process is precisely what they, and many others 
on the religious Right, tried to do. The problem is one that Charles Taylor 
identifies in his reading of political philosopher John Rawls: “Religious languages 
operate outside this discourse [of secular reason] by introducing extraneous 
premises that only believers can accept;” Rawls’ solution, according to Taylor, 
was to have everyone “talk the common language.”15 Yet Taylor rejects both 
Rawls’ call for a “common language” as well Habermas’ proposition that religious 
ideas can be used in the “public sphere” but must translated into a common
14 Habermas, “Political Theology,” 25-26.
15 Charles Taylor, “Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of Secularism,” in 
The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere, ed. Eduardo Mendieta and Jonathan 
VanAntwerpen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 49.
7
language prior to broad enforcement. Instead, the common “distinction in rational 
credibility between religious and nonreligious discourse,” a belief stemming from 
an “understanding of the Enlightenment” and its categorical split between reason 
and faith “as an absolute, unmitigated step forward,” is, Taylor argues, “utterly 
without foundation.”16 Religious reasoning is, according to Taylor and as I 
suggest in my study of the Gablers’ rhetoric, quite rational in its own way. But I 
also argue that “in its own way” is an important caveat. Habermas presumes the 
“truth content” of religiously-based reasoning is somehow “translatable” into a 
“common language.” Taylor insists that there should be little need for such 
translation. I suggest that perhaps in particular cases such translation, even 
when it is attempted, remains singularly ineffective because of the untranslatable 
premises undergirding the logic of particular arguments, including those that the 
Gablers make in What Are They Teaching Our Children? Together, the papers 
that comprise this thesis suggest that debates within a pluralistic democracy will 
proceed productively only if participants acknowledge both the historical twists 
and turns involved in the ways certain groups’ ideas and beliefs develop, and if 
participants correctly and clearly identify which presuppositions are being 
accepted a priori, and which are the source of the disagreement.
16 Ibid., 53.
8
Chapter 1: Towards a Genealogy of the Conflation of Christian and 
American Identity
I. Introduction 
Who owns “America”? This question is rarely asked pointedly. It 
nevertheless lies at the heart of many of the most heated debates over 
citizenship and political participation since the time that there were any “United 
States” to discuss. More useful for intellectual investigation, perhaps, is the 
following question: what can we learn from those who claim to own “America”? I 
must first make clear that I use the term America” not to refer to any 
geographical area within the political boundaries of the United States, however 
contested those boundaries have been and continue to be. Nor am I referring to 
the larger western hemisphere, in which region every nation arguably has a 
rightful claim to the term. Rather, I am referring to “America” as a word deployed 
in an effort to delimit the behaviors and qualities of an ideal citizenry, a sign 
hailed most often in efforts to exclude those with an alternate ideal. While 
throughout United States history, racial, class-based and gendered limitations 
have been drawn and redrawn in order to variously expand or restrict citizenship, 
religion, too, has played a consistent critical part in marking the boundaries 
around what and who count as “American.”
For much of the twentieth century, and particularly since the beginning of 
the Cold War, conservative evangelical Protestants have been among those 
groups to most vocally assert themselves as the true defenders (and their
9
morality as the truest foundation) of the ideals comprising their “America.”17 Their 
efforts to fashion a “Christian America” have recurred with such visible frequency 
that there is an illusion of necessity regarding the connection between their 
religion and their politics. Michel Foucault’s essay, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History,” provides an important corrective to such a view: “What is found at the 
historical beginning of things,” Foucault insists, “is not the inviolable identity of 
their origin; it is the dissension of other things. It is disparity.”18 Taking Foucault’s 
words to heart enables us to recognize that however easy it is to conflate 
“Christianity” and right-wing nationalism -  however consistently conservative 
evangelicals have conflated the two themselves -  the two can exist and have 
existed independent of each other. There is no logical (or theological) necessity 
for an affinity between the two, no “inviolable identity of their origin.” Throughout
171 use the term “conservative evangelical” as the least cumbersome 
method of speaking of a theologically-nuanced group that includes self- 
proclaimed fundamentalists (such as Jerry Falwell), those whom Margaret 
Bendroth in Fundamentalism and Gender. 1875 to the Present (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1993) terms “neo-evangelicals” (such as Billy Graham), as well 
as Pentecostals. The “conservative” label indicates the highly critical stance 
toward the American moral climate and a close alliance with conservative 
political policies, as opposed to other “progressive” evangelicals, such as Jim 
Wallis, who have claimed the “evangelical” label but have taken a markedly 
different approach toward social justice issues in particular. The “evangelical” 
label indicates the theological similarities each of these groups has historically 
shared. In David Bebbington’s terms, there are four core components of the 
evangelical tradition that continue to persist: “conversionism, the belief that lives 
need to be changed; activism, the expression of the gospel in effort; biblicism, a 
particular regard for the Bible; and... crucicentrism, a stress on the sacrifice of 
Christ on the cross.” Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History from the 1730s 
to the 1980s, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 3.
18 Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Language, 
Counter-Memory, Practice, ed. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1977), 142.
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history, of course, a proclaimed commitment to Christianity and a commitment to 
national interests have quite often been in the service of one another, but each 
particular conflation has a genealogy, and conservative evangelicals’ claims to 
the right to define “America” are no exception.
By the 1980s, a brand of conservative politics that had evolved to 
incorporate both economic libertarianism and social conservatism had become 
rhetorically fused with the brand of Christianity associated with conservative 
evangelicals. To outsiders, this fusion has persistently been perceived as illogical 
and anti-historical at best and manipulative or hypocritical at worst. To those on 
the inside, the “natural” connection between the component parts of this fusion 
has been understood as quite simply obvious, a-historical common sense. The 
fact that so many conservative evangelicals have spoken and continue to speak 
of nationalism and conservative politics as if they were an integral part of a 
unified, universal Christian belief system, while also demanding that their 
particular religious belief system be considered a necessary part of a true 
patriot’s identity is a fact that needs to be studied in light of the knowledge that 
this fusion has a genealogy.
These combinations became naturalized quite quickly within conservative
evangelical communities. Yet answering how they became normative for so
many and then, importantly, rearticulated as normative, even by conservative
evangelicals who are not politically active, remains a question answered only in
bits and pieces as of yet. While this matter demands much more intensive
scholarship, each of the books examined in this paper more or less obliquely
11
make insightful and important suggestions. David Sehat’s The Myth of American 
Religious Freedom makes it clear that the United States has had a long history of 
using a moral code rooted in a Protestant worldview to determine the 
qualifications for citizenship, granting a historical precedent for conservative 
evangelicals’ claim that Protestant morality (albeit their own sense of it) should 
be upheld as the nation’s moral code. Jonathan Herzog’s The Spiritual-Industrial 
Complex: America’s Religious Battle against Communism in the Early Cold War 
examines the ways in which intellectual, theological, and political elites in the 
early years of the Cold War self-consciously shaped and deployed a generically 
“Judeo-Christian” religion to combat the threat of Communism. This temporarily- 
explicit official endorsement of religion laid the groundwork for many of the 
presuppositions off of which the religious Right would operate, including 
providing its members with an identifiable point-in-time to mark the beginning of 
America’s spiritual degeneration. Susan Friend Harding’s The Book of Jerry 
Falwell: Fundamentalist Language and Politics describes a unique discourse, 
rooted in the language of the Bible, that masks ideological tension and elides 
historical change, creating the illusion of stability and eternal “truth” that appears 
obviously true for those who accept presuppositions regarding the Protestant 
Bible’s inerrant, literal nature and typological function. With the efforts of Moral 
Majority founder Jerry Falwell in particular, this discourse evolved to incorporate 
once-divided factions of conservative evangelicals into a unified, broader group, 
uniting their expanding array of conservative political causes and bestowing upon
political efforts the same appearance of moral indisputability granted the Bible.
12
Bethany Moreton’s To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of Christian Free
Enterprise and Ruth Murray Brown’s For a “Christian America”: A History of the
Religious Right both focus on the development of key religious Right ideas within
the context of “Wal-Mart Country,” the southern states west of the Mississippi.
Together their work suggests the way a wide array of regionally-rooted concerns
and cultural norms -  from free enterprise to patriarchal gender roles -  came to
be perceived and articulated as essential components of the “Christian America”
that was the “true” America. Lisa McGirr’s Suburban Warriors: Origins of the New
American Right and Darren Dochuk’s From Bible Belt to Sunbelt: Plain-Folk
Religion. Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of Conservative Evangelicalism help
explain the expansion of regionally-rooted movements to a nationally-recognized
political bloc by looking at the changing dynamics in southern California over the
decades surrounding and following World War Two. Together, the books
reviewed in this paper suggest the ways in which an awareness of the historical
privileging of a Protestant moral order, both culturally and institutionally, and an
existing civil-religious rhetoric melding God and country were themselves
assimilated into a conservative evangelical discourse. This was a language that
weighted every endeavor with spiritual significance, simultaneously masking
tensions between core ideological components of the larger New Right’s platform
and eliding a history that exposed such tensions. For conservative evangelicals
within the religious Right in both its nascence and its maturity, these factors
worked.together to inspire and legitimate their claims to represent America’s true
heritage, making the inseparability of nationalism, right wing politics, and
13
conservative evangelical faith appear to them to be a historical fact, an 
indisputable truth, and an obvious good.
II. The Persistence of Protestant Hegemony
A particularly Protestant articulation of American identity -  what the social 
mores that define that identity are, and what they ought to be -  has a history as 
old as the United States itself. In The Myth of American Religious Freedom. 
David Sehat explores this history. His book is a project arguing for the persistent 
failure of the United States’ political and legal systems to guarantee what is often 
touted as the central American ideal -  religious freedom. The existence of 
religious freedom in the United States is, he argues, a myth, and one that 
“wither[s] under scrutiny.”19 Regardless of how often the United States’ founding 
documents are cited by both sides of the aisle as the legal basis for a long­
standing tradition of religious freedom, and despite the fact that a handful 
(although by no means the oft-assumed consensus) of far-seeing Founding 
Fathers did push for a definitive separation of church and state, “the U.S. 
Constitution and the First Amendment did not create the separation that [men 
like] Madison and Jefferson advocated.”20 While the Constitution proclaimed this 
separation on a federal level, at the state and local levels such separation rarely 
occurred, and was in fact often deliberately resisted. Furthermore, the governing 
white male elite considered this Protestant morality to be normative and not 
religious -  regardless of how often marginalized religious groups protested both
19 David Sehat, The Myth of American Religious Freedom (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 3.
20 Ibid., 5.
14
assertions. Sehat asserts the existence, then, of what he terms a “moral 
establishment,” which he defines as a persistent bias toward a Protestant moral 
ethic in political and legal practice, aided and abetted by the individual states’ 
power and by the ambiguity of the First Amendment’s language.21
Sehat’s notion of a “moral establishment” resembles quite closely the idea 
of cultural hegemony -  “that part of a dominant worldview which has been 
naturalized” -  that anthropologists Jean and John Comaroff describe.22 
Interestingly, Sehat himself does not, at least explicitly, discuss the heuristic 
benefits of the concept of hegemony at all, and as a result his efforts “to get at 
something” like a “moral establishment” that is “so misty and yet persistent” fall 
short, keeping his explanations of its character and consequence a bit “mistier” 
than they need to be.23 The numerous and almost constant legal challenges that 
non-Protestant groups brought against the moral establishment, Sehat argues,
were not enough to depose it, for the issue was not merely or even primarily a
—<
21 “Principles of federalism gave the states an enormous reservoir of 
power to regulate the health, welfare, and morals of its residents, and religious 
partisans drew from this source to imprint their moral ideals onto state 
constitutions and judicial opinions. Supporters claimed that a religiously derived 
morality, enforceable by law, was essential to the health of the state... This 
connection between Protestant Christianity’s moral code and state power was 
commonplace throughout much of U.S. history.” Ibid., 5.
22 Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution: 
Christianity. Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa, vol. 1 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991), 25. The Comaroffs, pulling from the work of 
both Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci and French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, 
provide a clear and useful definition of hegemony: “We take hegemony to refer to 
that order of signs and practices, relations and distinctions, images and 
epistemologies -  drawn from a historically situated cultural field -  that come to be 
taken-for-granted as the natural and received shape of the world and everything 
that inhabits it.” Ibid., 23.
23 Sehat, Mvth. 9.
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legal one. The problem lay, he quite accurately asserts, in the pervasive 
presence of a mostly unconscious bias toward a particular religion’s moral code 
that lay at the heart of the dominant definition of what counted as “American” -  
essentially the affirmation of Protestant hegemony. Sehat acknowledges that for 
centuries, the idea that countries depended on legally-enforceable morality for 
their very survival was a commonplace. But as he makes clear, what most of 
those in the United States who wielded political and legal authority could not 
recognize (a blindness also reflected in widespread popular opinion, up through 
the middle of the twentieth century, at least) was the religiously-partisan nature of 
the definition of the supposedly a-religious “morality” that they were enforcing. 
Theories of hegemony go much further than theories privileging willful blindness 
toward explaining the persistence of such blindness in the face of consistent 
opposition. “Hegemony, at its most effective, is mute,” and those who are within it 
are within it precisely because its presence and power is invisible to them.24
The theory of hegemony that the Comaroffs espouse also helps explain 
why it was not until other cultural trends began broadly undermining the authority 
of religion in general that the “moral establishment” faced its first serious threats. 
Through explorations of the experience of religious dissenters (from early 
Baptists to the internally-divided abolition movement, from women’s rights 
advocates to the often-hounded atheists, “freethinkers,” and Catholics of the end 
of the nineteenth century), Sehat describes how the confrontations between 
these groups and the states’ legal and political apparatuses illuminated, however
24 Comaroff and Comaroff, Of Revelation. 24.
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briefly, the otherwise “shadowy character of the moral establishment.”25 Tellingly, 
however, he argues that it was not until the widening division between science 
and religion in the university, the social upheaval and new moral dilemmas posed 
by industrialism and corporate capitalism, and the falling-out between liberal 
Protestants and fundamentalists, that the existence of this “moral establishment” 
became visible to the dominant white male elites themselves, increasingly legible 
to them as religiously partisan. In the theory of hegemony the Comaroffs 
articulate, “once [hegemony’s] internal contradictions are revealed, when what 
seemed natural comes to be negotiable, when the ineffable is put into words -  
then hegemony becomes something other than itself. It turns into ideology and 
counterideology.” 26 It is at this point that resistance to an erstwhile hegemony but 
still-dominant ideology can effect significant change.
Nonetheless, “it is, more often than not, a very long road from the dawning 
of an antihegemonic consciousness to an ideological struggle won.”27 Sehat’s 
failure to utilize theories of hegemony lies at the root of his uncertainty about the 
status of the moral establishment now. At one point, he refers to the 1973 
decision in Roe v. Wade as the “death knell for the moral establishment,” but his
25 Sehat, Myth, 9.
26 The Comaroffs distinguish hegemony from ideology as follows: 
“Whereas the first consists of constructs and conventions that have come to be 
shared and naturalized throughout a political community, the second is the 
expression and ultimately the possession of a particular social group, although it 
may be widely peddled beyond. The first is nonnegotiable and therefore beyond 
direct argument; the second is more susceptible to being perceived as a matter 
of inimical opinion and interest and therefore is open to contestation. Hegemony 
homogenizes, ideology articulates.” Of Revelation. 24.
27 Ibid., 26.
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further discussion of the emergence of the religious Right and the political 
success of religious conservatives in the 2000s suggests that this moral 
establishment persists in some form with a vitality and tenacity that is unlikely to 
disappear.28 His assertion of the moral establishment’s “ultimate dismantling” 
seems contradictory in light of the fact that a moment later he insists that, “When 
the moral establishment went into decline, the religious Right mobilized to restore 
it, leaving us where we are today.”29 The Comaroffs’ theory sheds light on this 
puzzle. Hegemony, “always intrinsically unstable, always vulnerable” according 
to them, morphs into ideology that, as it is articulated and therefore made open to 
debate, makes it possible for both components of cultural domination to give 
“way to an ever more acute, articulate resistance,” and a proceeding counter-
Of)resistance.
It should not be unexpected, then, in light of Sehat’s work, that as 
American culture has become more pluralistic and (in general) more comfortable 
with religious diversity, certain Protestant communities with whom that long- 
dominant moral code continues to resonate should attempt to claim the role of 
defenders of the Protestant moral order -  in their minds, the “true” American way. 
Whatever its shortcomings, Sehat’s work offers the profound insight that 
conservative evangelicals who argued (and still do) that Protestant morality 
should be equated with “true Americanism” have historical precedent to back 
them. Whether or not Protestant morality (defined in selective ways) should be so
28 Sehat, Myth. 263.
29 Ibid., 8.
30 Comaroff and Comaroff, Of Revelation. 26-27.
18
equated with “true Americanism” is debatable, of course, and as Sehat makes 
clear, that question was debated from the beginning, and with increased 
consequence throughout the twentieth century. Understanding Sehat’s “moral 
establishment” as a kind of Protestant hegemony helps articulate what he 
struggles to explain -  the persistence of structural, institutional, and cultural 
biases toward Protestant morality; the explicitly partisan nature of the religious 
Right’s efforts to once again make a Protestant morality the unspoken boundary 
between those within “America” and those without; and the effectiveness of 
efforts to contain such re-hegemonizing campaigns by perpetuating the debate 
over the answer to the question, “Who owns America?” rather than settling any 
single answer.
III. The Religious Rhetoric of Early Cold War Nationalism
Jonathan Herzog claims in The Spiritual-Industrial Complex: America’s 
Religious Battle against Communism in the Early Cold War that not long after the 
close of World War Two, a nation-wide “revival” was in the works.31 “Of course,” 
Herzog acknowledges, revival itself “was nothing new. Religious leaders had 
long called for revival in times of trial and triumph. What made the early Cold War 
different was the degree to which other, secular institutions had reached the 
same conclusion.”32 Herzog exposes the deliberateness with which national and 
local political and cultural leaders linked American nationalism to a generic but
31 Jonathan P. Herzog, The Spiritual-Industrial Complex: America’s 
Religious Battle against Communism in the Early Cold War (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 70.
32 Ibid., 70.
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explicit “Judeo-Christian” religious affiliation and expression. What began as a
primarily intellectual discussion following the Russian Revolution developed into
the “spiritual-industrial complex,” encompassing a range of institutional and
organizational efforts to foster faith and draw a sharp line between “America” and
“communism.” This multi-pronged but temporary effort is another thread that
bolstered conservative evangelicals’ self-assured claim that their own version of
“Christian Americanism” represented the “true America.” However short-lived
official efforts to uphold claims to America’s “(Judeo-)Christian-ness” were, those
efforts granted the appearance of official legitimacy (to those primed to see it as
such) to conservative evangelicals’ claims over the next several decades that
America was indeed and, more importantly, ought to be a “Christian nation.”
Equating people’s “American-ness” with their explicit (however vague)
Judeo-Christian affiliation was an equivalency forged amidst the pressures upon
national political leaders following World War Two to firmly demarcate between
the United States and the stubbornly-amorphous nemesis, “communism.” The
evolution of this equation between Judeo-Christian faith and American-ness
originated primarily, according to Herzog, amidst conversations between
intellectuals and theologians in the 1920s and 1930s who argued for
understanding communism as a kind of religious rival to the “Judeo-Christian”
tradition. These conversations occurred in tandem with evidence from various
censuses and surveys suggesting a significant decline in religious practice
throughout the American middle class as well as the clear signs of a growing
d/srespect for the religion of the middle class among the media and
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intellectuals.33 Thus, Herzog suggests that perhaps the key reason the Cold War 
conflict so quickly took on the shape of a “holy war” is because what began as a 
discussion among the American intelligentsia defining communism “as a rival 
faith” antithetical “to Judeo-Christianity” was picked up by powerful political 
leaders post-World War Two who were managing a conflict in desperate need of 
clarification.34 If “displacing God as the center of morality” would, in the logic of 
the day, inevitably lead to communism, and if the secularizing trends that 
scholars and journalists among others were observing had indeed begun to 
affect that displacement, the urgent argument that “Americans had to fight faith 
with faith” might indeed appear well-founded.35 Attuned to the logic developed by 
intellectual and theological elites, national leaders began a “joint effort of 
government, business, educators, the media, and others” to rally the people to 
belief in God, in order to wield the weapon of religion against America’s 
ambiguous and atheistic new enemy, communism.36
Herzog, in his close attention to the decade following World War Two, 
does not fully examine the implications of what Sehat makes clear: the belief that
33 Herzog argues that the existence of a widespread impression of 
secularization operated perhaps even more powerfully than however real that 
widespread secularization actually was, for “more Americans received 
information from the media than ever before, and the information they obtained 
increasingly minimized and assailed the authority of American religion.” As he 
further explains later on, “Few had the time, ability, and interest to read the ever- 
expanding corpus of Communist treatises, so the task of defining Communism 
for public and political consumption fell to a relatively small group of scholars, 
journalists, religious leaders, politicians, and Communists themselves.” Spiritual- 
Industrial Complex. 22 and 45.
34 Ibid., 45.
35 Ibid., 51.
36 Ibid., 178.
21
“the success of any nation was tied intimately to a moral culture, incubated and 
guarded by religion” and official enforcement of that belief were not new, 
however novel the efforts to make that argument on the federal level were.37 
Sehat describes the way in which religiously-rooted morality gained hegemonic 
force through people’s refusal or inability to recognize those religious roots. 
Herzog, in agreement with Sehat, acknowledges that the rhetorical and 
ideological materials with which this equation could be made were themselves in 
existence long before the Cold War. Thus, insisting that Americans were by 
definition “Judeo-Christian” could appear, even to politicians, to be far more 
genuine than a mere political ploy -  a description of reality, in fact. Thus, the fact 
that leaders found somewhat intuitive the need to call for and implement a 
“Judeo-Christian” affiliation as a requirement for full citizenship in the 1950s 
suggests that the reason such a move could gain even the temporary credibility it 
did has much to do with Sehat’s longstanding “moral establishment,” newly 
visible and now deployed in explicit and powerful ways.
Naming, though, also fractures, creating apertures through which 
alternative definitions and explanations can be advanced. Winnifred Sullivan 
argues in her case study of court efforts to enforce religious freedom that “in 
order to enforce laws guaranteeing religious freedom you must first have 
religion.”38 “Defining religion,” however, “is difficult,” perpetuating debates over
37 Ibid., 78.
38 Sullivan, Impossibility. 1.
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whose “religion” qualifies as such.39 The spiritual-industrial complex Herzog 
describes was a highly organized, multi-pronged attempt to do exactly that -  
define religion in an effort to clarify the limits of citizenship. For at least the 
decade-and-a-half on which Herzog focuses, a great range of people did indeed 
accept the “faith” of “Christian Americanism”-  willingly or begrudgingly -  as a 
truism and mark of citizenship. Yet this top-down infusion of religion into 
nationalism through institutional channels worked on a large and general scale 
for a short time only, until the beginning of John F. Kennedy’s presidency.40 
Representing the Cold War as a battle between “faiths” ultimately exposed the 
limits and contradictions of state-guided spirituality in a nation whose constitution 
famously proclaimed religious freedom. The spiritual-industrial complex became 
further evidence of the excesses of the McCarthy era, prompting dissenters to 
offer alternative definitions both of religion and the qualifications for citizenship. 
By the 1960s, voices were crying persuasively for the “reprivatization of 
spirituality.”41 As Herzog suggests, “The usefulness of religion in the Cold War 
was not self-evident to most Americans; they needed direction. So too did 
sacralization require more than the words of religious leaders. Sacralization
39 Ibid., 1.
40 “The Cold War, now fifteen years old, had not produced the sweeping 
domestic conversions to the Communist faith that had concerned J. Edgar 
Hoover, Tom C. Clark, or Claire Boothe Luce. The uncertainty and speculation 
once at the forefront of American consciousness had diminished. There were fits 
of anxiety still to come, but the kind of Communist infiltration depicted 
metaphorically in cinematic romps like Invasion of the Body Snatchers seemed 
an ever fainter possibility.” Herzog, Spiritual-Industrial Complex, 185.
41 Ibid.,188.
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required consensus. And as that consensus began to disintegrate, so too would 
its spiritual fruits.”42
However hazily-outlined Herzog’s “consensus” is, he nonetheless 
illuminates our understanding of “Christian Americanism” in its later twentieth 
century manifestations by insisting that at least some people continued to believe 
in the existence of that consensus, and more importantly in the need to maintain 
it: “By the late 1950s, conservative religious leaders had picked up the drooping 
banner of religious anti-Communism and were carrying it in their own crusade.”43 
Indeed, the “religious arguments marshaled against Communism during the 
1950s provided a platform from which both modern religious and political 
conservatism grew.”44 This “holy war that once concerned all religious 
Americans,” from Catholics to liberal and mainstream Protestants, had become 
“the province, and indeed the obsession, of a fraction of them.”45 The organizers 
of the “spiritual-industrial complex” had intended it to be a largely ecumenical 
affair (within “Judeo-Christian” bounds, of course). Yet the heritage of Protestant 
privilege and the very generic nature of the rhetoric, it could be argued, made it 
easier for this unique Cold-War tactic to appear like confirmation that the 
government was merely upholding a particularly Protestant Christianity as 
American once more. Furthermore, this “spiritual-industrial complex” birthed “a 
tautology used by the opponents of secularism in future decades...: America
42 Ibid., 173.
43 Ibid., 206.
44 Ibid., 12.
45 Ibid., 207.
24
employed these expressions [entwining nationalism with religion] because it was 
religious, and America was religious because it employed these expressions. 
Sacralization had become a self-justifying endeavor.”46 Herzog demonstrates 
convincingly that in his particular case, “the process by which religious faith has 
been fused with popular conceptions of Americanism was not brought about by 
some movement of destiny’s hand.”47 He argues that “for millions constantly 
bombarded with the message that the religious could not be Communists, it was 
a short logical step to the authoritative axiom that the irreligious could not be true 
Americans.”48 A centuries-old history of Protestant privilege made this “logic” 
immensely easier, and it resonated with those groups inclined to perceive and 
interpret all experience through a religious lens.
IV. The Impact of Bible-Based Discourse
Like Sehat, Herzog’s focus is not on religious communities or groups, but
*
rather on the way in which language and ideas rooted in particular religious 
traditions became entwined with supposedly non-religious institutions. Thus, 
rather than focusing on the ways in which religious groups incorporate and 
deploy nationalistic rhetoric -  the issue that I wish to explore -  Herzog looks at 
the ways in which in which “other, more unlikely, institutions” such as the media, 
higher education, and various arms of the federal government became, in the 
first decade of the Cold War, “the greatest advocates of religion’s importance to
46 Ibid., 186.
47 Ibid., 12.
48 Ibid.
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American society.”49 Herzog’s work nevertheless provides critical insight into the 
reverse conundrum. While he makes it clear that to many within the state and 
civic structures employing “spiritual” rhetoric, “God” and “faith” were deliberately 
vague and ambiguous terms intended to encompass a broad group of people, 
groups such as conservative evangelicals consistently found, in those terms 
already familiar to them, a much narrower meaning, and thus a much narrower 
definition of “America.” Many citizens came to be convinced that the socially and 
economically conservative political package increasingly claimed by adherents to 
a political “New Right” was simultaneously God’s way and the American way. To 
understand how this process worked, we must look carefully at the unique 
“language” conservative evangelicals often speak, a language that according to 
anthropologist Susan Harding, is a Bible-based discourse whose primacy over 
other discourses tends to translate -  to powerful effect -  many otherwise non- 
religiously grounded ideas into its own terms.
In The Book of Jerry Falwell: Fundamentalist Language and Politics. 
Harding provides profound insight into understanding the means by which 
conservative evangelicals have come to accept “Christian Americanism” as an 
indisputable truth. The nucleus of Harding’s work is based on her observations 
throughout the 1980s of Virginian fundamentalist and Moral Majority founder 
Jerry Falwell and his community of followers. She conducts lengthy exegeses of 
Jerry Falwell’s sermons and his organizations’ various publications, as well as of 
the political rhetoric he and his organizations developed surrounding certain key
49 Ibid., 12.
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issues for the religious Right -  social issues such as abortion, educational issues 
such as the debates over evolution and creation science, public relations issues 
such as the televangelism scandals of the 1980s, theological issues such as 
eschatology. Through her close readings, Harding describes a rhetoric based on 
Protestant fundamentalism’s unique understanding of the Bible, arguing for that 
rhetoric’s central role in uniting divergent strains of conservative evangelicalism 
around a shared vision of “America,” what it is and what it should be.50
The discourse that evolved through the efforts of Jerry Falwell and others 
derived its power, she argues, by guiding willing listeners toward perceiving 
political issues through the lens of the language conservative evangelicals 
trusted most and with which they were most familiar -  the language of the Bible. 
While “Falwell’s fundamentalist empire” might indeed have been an “immense 
empire of words,” calling it a “factory of words, a veritable Bible-based language 
industry,” as Harding does, is somewhat misleading.51 Uniting a particular 
political ideology (conservatism) with a particular religious faith (broadly 
evangelical) was an effort that certainly required the movement’s leaders to self­
50 Regarding the somewhat unlikely reconciliation of fundamentalists with 
neo-evangelicals, Harding writes, “Most notably, forty years of ecumenical 
crusade evangelism by Billy Graham’s organization, supplemented by the work 
of Bill Bright [of Campus Crusade] and many others, had renewed and 
reentrenched a shared elementary language of what counted as a Christian, 
namely, someone who had realized he was a sinner, asked Jesus to forgive him, 
and accepted Jesus into his heart as his personal savior.” By simplifying the 
message to basics most could agree upon, these men “thus willfully worked 
against the grain of the many forces that divided theologically conservative 
Christians.” Susan Friend Harding, The Book of Jerry Falwell: Fundamentalist 
Language and Politics. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 19.
51 Ibid., 15.
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consciously develop a convincing and flexible rhetoric. That rhetoric, though, 
evolved in such a way as to incorporate new ideas and new causes into a 
language already spoken. Harding’s choice to remain on the well-worn path of 
focusing on the religious Right’s leaders limits her ability to explain the efficacy of 
such language, particularly its ability to consistently persuade such a large 
contingency of “followers.” She justifies her almost-exclusive “focus on the 
language of preachers” by arguing that “preachers are master-speakers. As they 
teach their language through sermons, speeches, and writings and enact its 
stories in their lives, they mold their church into the Church, a living sequel to the 
Bible.”52 To a degree this claim is persuasive. Preachers, even in anti- 
hierarchical religious traditions like evangelicalism, play an important role in 
guiding their flock. Denying the notion that to some degree pastors’ speech is 
persuasive because they, as trusted authorities, speak it, would be naive. Yet 
Harding’s reticence to qualify preachers’ power is itself an oversimplification of 
the phenomenon she is trying to explain, making it hard to see the importance of 
a reality that lurks behind her narrative. Preachers may be “master-speakers,” 
but they only succeed in “molding their church” because the language they 
master is a language that is for many of their “followers” quotidian, a discourse 
whose presuppositions infuse the way in which most who tacitly affirm them 
speak of nearly all of their experiences. Leaders like Falwell succeeded largely 
because of their ability to use familiar verbal gestures and rhetorical techniques 
for new ends and to address new causes. However, only because the preachers’
52 Ibid., xiii.
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language was also the listeners’ could the dissonances that occur between 
Christian cause and economic or political cause be so widely camouflaged, and 
the translation of right-wing economic or political causes into a legitimizing 
religious language become so broadly convincing.
Whatever the weaknesses of her focus on leadership, Harding’s project is 
truly innovative, and she succeeds in making a strong case for arguing that 
actually believing the Bible is literally true, as fundamentalists by definition do 
(and most conservative evangelicals do as well), lies at the foundation of a 
unique and uniquely unifying discourse. This belief shapes how this particular 
group of people interprets the past:
Biblical narrators, past and present, tell histories, the way things actually 
happened. Their stories are literally true in the sense that they do not 
represent history, they are history. Likewise, the connections that anointed 
narrators propose between one story, such as Joshua’s [an Old 
Testament figure], and another, such as Jerry [Falwell’s], are not mere 
filaments of interpretation tying tales together in some folk fantasy. They 
are historical tissues, sinews of divine purpose, design and will that join 
concrete events across millennia.53 
Harding is right to assert that “fundamentalists, and born-again Christians 
generally, do not simply believe, they know, that the Bible is true and is still 
coming true... [L]ike biblical realists before the coming of modernity, modern 
Bible believers effectively and perpetually close the gap and so generate a world
53 Ibid., 110.
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in which their faith is obviously true.”54 For these people, the past as told in the 
Bible provides the model by which people should presently live. Harding thus 
hints at the ways in which this argument can be applied not just to the lens 
through which many on the religious Right understand biblical history, but how 
they understand history in general. With this knowledge it becomes less 
surprising that United States’ own past -  and specifically the historical privileging 
of the Protestant moral code -  should be upheld as a similar model, the model by 
which all Americans should presently live. The way in which this particular group 
reads their past and their world is the way they read the Bible -  with the 
assumption that there is one correct interpretation and with, in Margaret 
Bendroth’s words, an “insistence on the utter reliability of God’s word” to provide 
“answers to life’s mysteries, both social and personal.”55
V. God and America in Wal-Mart Country 
Susan Harding accurately reminds us that, “as fundamentalists, 
pentecostals, charismatics, and even evangelicals, these theologically 
conservative Protestants had until the late 1970s seen themselves as marginal, if 
not enclaves or scattered remnants, relative to a perceived liberal Protestant
54 Ibid., 272. “The slippery slope argument and, more generally, the strict 
Bible inerrancy polemic cover up the variety of interpretations of a text that 
coexists even within one church. And they cover up the speed with which 
interpretations, including official ones, can be revised -  or even forgotten 
altogether....” For example, “As support for segregation gradually eroded during 
the late 1960s and 1970s, there was no debate about the truth of these Bible 
verses. They simply stopped being cited. They, or rather their prevailing 
interpretation which had been considered to be the biblically inerrant truth, 
ceased to be part of the spoken Bible.” Ibid., 180-181.
55 Bendroth, Fundamentalism and Gender. 33-34.
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mainstream.”56 Harding emphasizes the central role a Bible-based language 
played in creating a sense of shared vision and purpose between not-always 
friendly “enclaves” of conservative evangelicals, arguing that “once they saw 
themselves, and were seen, as related to one another and, taken together, as 
the Protestant majority, their marginal days were numbered.”57 Recognizing the 
existence and power of this Bible-based discourse itself, however, does little to 
explain the connections between a project that for Harding began in Lynchburg, 
Virginia in the mid-1970s and the efforts of people from across the United States 
to rearticulate their sense of nationalism and their conservative political platform 
in terms of their religious faith. In order to explain how conservative evangelicals 
came to imagine themselves as a “majority” (to use Falwell’s term) and as the 
true heirs and defenders of American identity, we must step back and look at the 
development of their sense of national unity through close examination of the 
regional contexts which inspired and reinforced the acts of translation required to 
claim “America” as conservative evangelicals’ own.
Bethany Moreton’s To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of Christian 
Free Enterprise, as its subtitle suggests, centers on how capitalism became not 
just an American but a “Christian” thing to do. Wal-Mart was established in rural 
Arkansas, where Jeffersonian-style populist democracy and evangelical Christian 
faith had long grown hand-in-hand. The rapidly-interconnecting world of the post- 
World War Two era and the Sunbelt’s growing role in fulfilling Cold War demands
56 Harding, Jerry Falwell. 20.
57 Ibid., 20.
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created new realities and opportunities, simultaneously challenging long-held 
beliefs about the importance of small-scale democracy and a patriarchal family 
and community structure. The growth of corporate capitalism from the turn of the 
century forward, along with rural women’s need to become wage-earners in order 
to supplement the suffering farm economy were unstoppable changes. The 
inevitability of these changes is nonetheless an inadequate explanation of 
people’s attitude toward them. Moreton’s study of Wal-Mart’s development 
reveals the ways in which the company repackaged free enterprise so that “mass 
consumption [became] safe for the white Protestant heartland, and mass service 
work [became] an honorable zone of endeavor,” a project that proved to be the 
key to the company’s otherwise-unlikely success.58 Together, Wal-Mart’s leaders 
and the local Arkansas populace succeeded over the course of several decades 
into translating what was once unpalatable to a deeply-religious region into terms 
that made consumption and service work not just acceptable, but appear to many 
to be the truly American -  and Christian -  way of life.59
Moreton argues that “the new Republican coalition” that emerged around 
the 1980 presidential election “comprised a pair of strange bedfellows: laissez- 
faire champions of the free market unevenly yoked to a broad base of
58 Moreton, Wal-Mart. 88.
59 Moreton explains that by “entering the waged work force under a 
service economy rather than an industrial one, they changed both work and 
family life, and crafted a new ideology to explain the relationship between the 
two. For the emerging Wal-Mart constituency, faith in God and faith in the market 
grew in tandem.” Ibid., 5.
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evangelical activists.”60 Why the combination of these two things, particularly 
when “the very antigovernment, probusiness policies” for which so many of these 
working Americans were voting “undermined their own tenuous place in the 
middle class?”61 Moreton makes the simple but important observation that 
geographical locality and economic necessity played a part in fusing key ideas. 
Quite simply, when, in the 1960s and 1970s, “Wal-Mart’s rapid growth and 
increasing technological sophistication forced the retailer to recruit new 
managers on college campuses, it turned to the nearby Christian colleges.”62 
Drawing upon local resources -  in this case Christian colleges -  was at one level 
a pragmatic choice. “Small Protestant colleges and big businesses,” however, 
“were not traditional allies”:
At least initially, [Christian colleges’] broader faculty constituency was 
rarely independently motivated by the cause so much as alive to the 
practical benefits, generally in favor of free-market economics -  they 
taught business, after all -  and alert to the interesting teaching and 
research opportunities offered by the new subfield. Forging the alloy of 
Christian free enterprise required tremendous effort and resources, and 
the zeal of one or two ideologically committed proponents... Once the 
genie was out of the bottle, however, the equation shifted. The new
60 Ibid., 4.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., 127.
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centers and majors drew faculty as well as students with those interests,
and the corporate sponsors’ influence became ubiquitous 63 
Whatever novelty there was to what was born out of practical necessity for 
business and religious leadership, then, gradually wore off, becoming accepted 
as common sense to their respective and overlapping constituencies.
However influential those initially-pragmatic choices were in the long run, 
Moreton asserts that the key to understanding the forging of “Christian free 
enterprise” in the Ozarks and beyond lies in the way in which Wal-Mart’s version 
of free enterprise was rhetorically refashioned to fit within the explicitly religious 
framework of “Christian service.” Sam Walton, well-aware of the resistance local 
Arkansans would have for any northern-style big chain stores, inaugurated this 
approach with his decidedly local tack. When he opened “his first Wal-Mart 
Discount City in 1962,” Walton knew he would have to promote “his enterprise as 
an Ozarks affair.”64 Moreton argues that “the Wal-Mart mode of shopping 
removed several traditional stumbling blocks for Christian devotees of 
consumption.”65 First, “the entire dime-store tradition” off of which Wal-Mart was 
initially modeled signified “frugality, not opulence,” something thrifty Arkansans 
would have resisted.66 Secondly, in communities that idealized patriarchal family 
structures, “as long as mass buying could mean procuring humble products ‘for 
the family,’ as long as men could perform women’s work without losing their
63 Ibid., 161.
64 Ibid., 28, 25.
65 Ibid., 89.
66 Ibid., 88.
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authority, as long as front-line service workers could derive dignity and meaning 
from their labors, the service economy could survive its internal contradictions. 
Consumer capitalism could be born again.”67 Because “in this context, the salient 
identity became not citizen-consumer nor worker of the world, but Christian 
servant,” the potential tensions between conservative evangelical faith, white 
middle-class material interests, patriarchal family structure, and free market 
capitalism could be overlooked.68
The economic realities of Wal-Mart’s corporate capitalism may have 
resembled those of any large corporation, but the evangelical-friendly rhetoric 
and practices in which Wal-Mart packaged itself worked to discourage the 
populace from closely critiquing the company. Sam Walton and his peers knew 
that Wal-Mart could only succeed if it spoke the language of its people, and in 
cooperation with the people themselves, the company forged a “gospel of free 
enterprise.”69 The language of Christian service bestowed upon free enterprise 
not just spiritual significance, but also a way to retain an important sense of 
continuity about the values that had long mattered most in Wal-Mart country -  
the dignity of “self-sufficiency” and “family stability and masculine authority” -  in a 
rapidly-changing world.70 A “particular historical moment, a particular geography, 
and a particular religious ecology” thus shaped and fulfilled Sam Walton’s 
business vision, but Wal-Mart’s success'“was not a simple matter of elite
67 Ibid., 89.
68 Ibid., 101.
69 Ibid., 270.
70 Ibid.
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manipulation; it did not make political dupes of Kansans or Arkansans.”71 Rather, 
the way in which Wal-Mart’s leadership presented the business resonated with 
the needs of a regional culture in crisis. Wal-Mart country’s deeply religious 
demographic recognized and found reassurance in a rhetoric that put inevitable 
and potentially threatening changes in a positive, familiar language. And, once 
translated, the gospel of free enterprise could become not just a part of their 
political platform, but a compatible component of their faith itself.
Bethany Moreton argues for Wal-Mart’s significant part in making free 
enterprise believably compatible with conservative evangelicalism in the Ozark 
region. She does not explore how those conservative evangelicals, who came to 
widely accept that notion that their faith had always upheld free enterprise policy 
and practice, also came to assert the “truth” of this conflation with the “true” 
American way. While Ruth Murray Brown does not focus on economics as does 
Moreton, in For a Christian America: A History of the Religious Right, she 
explores a parallel conflation and offers applicable insights. Brown argues that 
the campaign against the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) in the 1970s laid a 
significant portion of the groundwork for the formation of the religious Right in the 
1980s by mobilizing conservative evangelical women to political action.72 The
71 Ibid.
72 Brown’s claim that the anti-ERA movement laid “the foundation for what 
came to be called the Christian Right” is, as are many of her claims, overstated, 
as even the few books discussed within this review essay make clear. 
Nevertheless, she makes a strong case for the movement’s important role both in 
explaining the rise of and understanding the nature of the “Christian Right.” Ruth 
Murray Brown, For a “Christian America”: A History of the Religious Right. 
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2002), 16.
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movement to defeat the ERA began in earnest in Oklahoma, the first state to 
deny ratification of the amendment (in March 1972) and part of the same “Wal- 
Mart country” that Moreton studies. While Moreton explains the desire to uphold 
a patriarchal family model and the resistance to big government and big business 
in regional and historical terms, Brown proposes another explanation. The heart 
of Brown’s argument is that a particular patriarchal view of the family, as well as 
a refusal to countenance any government interference in the family, persuaded 
evangelical women and their allies in Oklahoma and the surrounding states in 
particular to work to defeat the ERA. However many other factors may have 
contributed to the regional development and elevation of patriarchy and 
resistance to state interference, Brown insists that those fighting the ERA 
themselves understood their ideal family model as essentially sacred, rooted in 
their religious worldview. Thus, “On a very personal level, they feared that 
entrenching feminist values in the Constitution would mean the end of their Bible- 
based way of life.”73
This fear that their “Bible-based way of life” was at stake stemmed largely 
from the fact that conservative evangelicals throughout the South, as Brown 
argues, had become increasingly “disturbed” by the “rebelling against the norms 
of personal behavior” that had occurred particularly dramatically throughout the 
1960s. The ratification effort for the ERA, insists Brown, provided one of the first 
opportunities for these concerned citizens to articulate their fears in a public 
manner and mobilize in a specific, nationally-important effort. However popular -
73 Ibid., 15.
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and at times accurate -  the assumption that conservative evangelicals’ 
conscious intent in their mobilization was to regain political power lost in the 
earlier part of the twentieth century, Brown reminds us that for many of the 
women who fought against ratification, “the real threat of the ERA was not just 
the specifics of unisex restrooms or of drafting women, or even of legalizing 
abortion -  things emphasized by the popular media -  but the broader threat of 
government interference with the right of families to raise their children in the 
ways prescribed by their religion. They saw defeating the ERA as a way of 
restoring those rights and halting moral decline.”74
Brown’s phrasing makes it easy to pass over the fact that “restoring those 
rights” and “halting moral decline” were two distinct rhetorical stances, however 
often they were intertwined. While understanding the anti-Era campaign as 
merely an attempt by certain religious groups to defend and protect their 
particular way of life holds some truth, it is only partially accurate, for it does not 
offer a satisfactory interpretation of the reasons why they not only fought against 
what they perceived would negatively affect themselves personally, but why they 
also sought to instate their way of life on the entire nation. Importantly, Brown 
herself “came to see that the early fight against the ERA was just one facet of the 
struggle to regain what they believed was a lost Christian heritage.”75 As noted 
earlier, those who celebrated the nation’s “Christian heritage” could find 
affirmation of their stance in the Cold War government-promoted religious
74 Ibid., 16.
75 Ibid., 16.
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nationalism that Herzog describes and whose broadly Christian language they 
could quite easily (mis)read as an official endorsement of their way of life as the 
“American” way of life. Furthermore, Brown effectively demonstrates that “the 
arguments of the Christian Right in these cases are... plausible if one accepts 
the premises that constitutional interpretation should be limited to the actual 
words of the original Constitution, and that practices common in the early 
nineteenth century should therefore be allowed in the late twentieth century as 
well.”76 Believing that the Constitution should be interpreted in a similar literal, 
devotional way as the Bible, and believing that an idealized point in the American 
past provides the model whereby we all should live were beliefs that stemmed 
directly from fundamentalist theology. Furthermore, Brown’s argument intersects 
with Susan Harding’s here, for “the pastors of [these women’s] churches, like 
Jeremiah in the Old Testament, prophes[ied] the wrath of God’s judgment 
against the people... The belief that God would punish America for her sins, 
preached in so many churches, primed fundamentalists to join a movement 
promising to ‘turn it around.’”77 Brown’s example offers further confirmation of 
Harding’s idea that fundamentalists and their less-strict evangelical counterparts 
tended to envision themselves as a continuation of and modeling their lives after 
the stories of the Bible. Thus, reading America as a type of Israel, 
fundamentalists and conservative evangelicals broadly remained convinced that 
“God looks with favor on America because of the ‘faith of the forefathers’... [Anti-
76 Ibid., 240.
77 Ibid., 73.
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ERA activists] were appalled at what they saw as America’s moral decline, not 
only because they personally disapproved of societal trends and attitudes, but 
because they believed that God’s favor” upon America “is conditional.”78
Why did so many people find a reading of “American” identity as a type of 
Israel so appealing and convincing? The answers are complex and many, as 
always. Brown’s work, however, highlights the importance of the belief that the 
United States’ (highly mythologized) moment of founding provided, like Israel’s 
founding moment, the blueprint for what the nation’s identity ought to be.
Perhaps just as importantly, “the social life of a Church of Christ member [and 
members of many other conservative evangelical denominations] is... closely 
circumscribed by church activities, so there is less opportunity to develop ideas 
independent of the church.”79 The very fact that religious activities absorbed anti- 
ERA activists’ mental and social activities suggests how a highly-stable, self- 
sustaining interpretation can develop. For the Oklahoman fundamentalists Brown 
interviewed, the larger portion of their social time was spent conversing with 
those who agreed with them and shared their religiously-grounded worldview. In 
a region in which religious life has, as Moreton emphasizes, long dominated the 
cultural landscape, it should perhaps not be surprising at all that experience and 
constant community affirmation would make it rather natural to assume that one’s 
particular way of seeing the world was universally true, and therefore applicable 
to everyone. Thus, the campaign that Brown describes carried, for those
78 Ibid., 235.
79 Ibid.,75.
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Oklahoma women who fought against the ERA, the weight of saving not just 
these conservative evangelical women’s own skins, but of saving the soul of the 
nation itself.
VI. California: Bringing Conservative Evangelical Nationalism to the National
Stage
Lisa McGirr’s Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right 
reinforces Jonathan Herzog’s conclusion that the Cold War decisively shaped the 
development of the New Right, of which the religious Right, with its loud defense 
of a “Christian America,” was a part. McGirr’s work is a case study of the 
suburban culture of Orange County, California. Orange County is often 
considered the heart of the Cold-War military-industrial complex, a region whose 
economic development exploded as a result during the decades following World 
War Two. It was within this rapidly-growing and ever-changing landscape that the 
white, middle-class citizens who contributed to and benefited from California’s 
military-industrial complex lived and worked. These denizens of the burgeoning 
suburbs, McGirr argues, were critical in uniting the “distinct ideological strands of 
right-wing thought” -  social conservatism and economic libertarianism -  that 
became the platform of an increasingly coherent movement that, by the 1980 
presidential election, had gained enough momentum to shape politics on a 
national scale.80 McGirr sets her work against a long tradition in both popular 
media and contemporary scholarship of portraying this recent strain of
80 Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American 
Right. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 152.
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conservatism as a collection of “emotional, irrational ‘kooks’” motivated by 
“psychological distress.”81 This, McGirr insists, is not only unfair, but inaccurate. 
The emergence of the New Right was from the get-go a largely mainstream 
affair, as its vibrant presence outside of the almost-mythical rural “backwoods” of 
the South makes clear. McGirr studies the issues that motivated these new 
suburbanites (largely eager emigres from the South) to political action. She also 
carefully examines the environment in which these suburbanites lived, parses the 
rhetoric of key conservative political leaders to discover that rhetoric’s appeal to 
the suburbanites, and conducts oral histories, allowing a number of these 
“warriors” to speak for themselves. Through these various means, McGirr 
attempts to access the reasons why the New Right was able to expand to the 
national stage -  and stay there. Upsetting the popular notion of conservative 
appeal as essentially irrational, McGirr proposes instead that, in light of their 
regional context and the evidence of their own lives, for successful suburban 
Orange Countians at least, the new economic and social conservatism that 
comprised the New Right quite simply made sense. While Suburban Warriors 
treats religion only briefly and primarily obliquely, it is nevertheless an important 
contribution to the effort to identify the various threads that merged to allow and 
encourage the conflation of evangelical faith, conservative politics, and 
nationalism that this paper examines.
How did such a fusion come to make sense, however? For McGirr, the 
key lies in understanding context, and more specifically, the way in which the
81 Ibid., 6-7.
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Orange County environment and culture -  “a fertile seedbed for right-wing 
growth” -  shaped these suburbanites’ political stances.82 The fusion of economic 
and social conservatism that came to define the New Right proved persuasive 
because it resonated not only with these suburbanites’ firmly-rooted moral and 
spiritual beliefs, but because the two threads together resonated with many 
Orange Countians’ lived experience. Put simply, “The middle-class men and 
women who populated Orange County found meaning in a set of politics that 
affirmed the grounding of their lives in individual success and yet critiqued the 
social consequences of the market by calling for a return to ‘traditional’ values, 
local control, strict morality, and strong authority.”83 Whatever justification these 
members of the emerging “New Right” might themselves have given for their 
political activities, one thing stands out from a more distanced perspective - it 
was in their own interest to make sense of the lives they were living in a way that 
justified that lifestyle. To do so, they drew ideas together that there had been less 
of an impetus to draw together before. Within the context of their experience, the 
New Right agenda seemed intuitively, if not tightly logically, correct to these 
suburbanites.
In order for any sort of shared mindset uniting people in political 
endeavors to emerge, however, communication networks must develop. Orange 
Countians had to deliberately and self-consciously forge these networks in the 
isolating environment of sprawling, depersonalizing suburbia. Thus, while the
82 Ibid., 15.
83 Ibid., 53.
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grassroots activists that McGirr studies did not, for the most part, have a national 
political agenda on their minds at the outset, they did deliberately search out and 
maintain connections with others like themselves. As McGirr explains, “It was... 
in the mundane yet complex world of school battles, evangelical churches, and 
local politics, that the grassroots New Right asserted itself,” and suburban 
grassroots activists received increasing confirmation of a broadly shared identity 
through their gradually snowballing connections with others who shared their 
views.84 These activities and communication networks met not only their political 
aims, but their desires for community as well. McGirr argues that the reality (and 
equally important sense) of being part of a large community of like-minded 
people only continued to expand as a result of conservative rhetoric de­
radicalized after Barry Goldwater’s presidential campaign, “the debacle of 
1964.”85 McGirr insists that after this moment of self-evaluation, “these men and 
women” of suburban Orange County “appreciated the need to jettison the 
controversial rhetoric that had gotten Goldwater into trouble. In effect, they 
expounded a new brand of conservatism.”86 As suburban life expanded to more 
(white) Americans and the nation’s moral climate became more tumultuous, “the 
reworked conservative package, voiced ever more in the language of the 
‘people,’ resonated with growing numbers of Americans, bringing conservatives
84 Ibid., 56.
85 Ibid., 196.
86 Ibid..
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to a position of power that they had previously enjoyed only prior to the New 
Deal.”87
While McGirr’s focus is on the New Right as a whole, not merely its 
religious arm, she nonetheless takes a significant amount of time to answer the 
question, “Why were so many Orange Countians attracted to [conservative 
evangelical] churches?”88 This way this question is phrased unfortunately implies 
that these suburbanites came to church only after they became politically active, 
or else that conservative evangelical churches and politically active suburbanites 
were two separate groups of people. These implications are, as Darren Dochuk’s 
work will shortly make clear, very much not the case. Still, McGirr is right to argue 
that “the grassroots dissatisfaction with the trend of national politics may have 
come to naught, had it not been for the institutional support provided by 
strategically placed local organizations,” and churches were among these 
organizations.89 McGirr’s emphasis on external environmental factors leads her 
to quite logically intuit that these people’s search for community “in a privatized, 
physically isolated landscape” in part compelled them to find that community 
where it already existed, and evangelical churches were one of those places.90 
To an extent, McGirr acknowledges the importance of many suburbanites’ pre­
existing religiosity, admitting that while “a belief in conservative Protestant 
doctrine did not make a right-wing political activist..., these adherents’ normative
87 Ibid., 261.
88 Ibid., 49.
89 Ibid., 98.
90 Ibid., 49.
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conservatism, firm religious convictions, and moral values helped infuse a 
socially conservative political culture.”91 However, she does not fully explore the 
idea that, while it is highly likely that many people used churches as political 
platforms simply because the churches were there, it seems equally likely that 
those who worked through these institutions chose to do so because they 
believed there were religious reasons for the battles they fought. Here it is helpful 
to recall Jonathan Herzog’s discussion of the “spiritual-industrial complex,” 
particularly since fighting Communism was in large part the first “cause” for 
McGirr’s New Right. If Herzog is right in his assessment that anti-Communism 
became a concern to religious people largely because it had been framed as an 
essentially spiritual conflict, then it also seems likely that people of faith living in 
prosperous, suburban Orange County might have conceived of “political” 
activities as essentially spiritual ones.
McGirr’s work thus somewhat obliquely addresses the connection 
between the conservative political bent and a conservative evangelical religious 
worldview. She nevertheless manages to highlight several key ideas that help 
explain that connection. First, she affirms the importance of remembering that 
people with shared beliefs tend to attract each other, which easily paves the way 
for that particular group to re-imagine their particularities as universals. Second, 
she makes a strong case (as Ruth Murray Brown does, too) for examining the 
way in which particular environments tend to lead people to universalize and 
valorize their personal narratives about how they got where they are. Her organic
91 Ibid.
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explanation thus offers some important clues as to how those who conflated 
religion, capitalism, social conservatism, and American patriotism were able to 
believe that conflation was, in a way, eternally true.
Whereas Orange County for McGirr is merely one “lens” through which to 
examine the rise of the New Right, for Darren Dochuk, Southern California was 
not just the heart of the broader New Right. It also functioned as the incubator for 
the fusion of right-wing politics, nationalism, and conservative evangelicalism that 
would become the distinguishing mark of the Religious Right. In From Bible Belt 
to Sunbelt: Plain-Folk Religion. Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of Evangelical 
Conservatism. Dochuk argues that many of these Southern Californians, recent 
migrants from the western South, not only brought with them a distinctive 
“Southern evangelicalism” whose pragmatic, confident “Texas theology” 
blossomed in a “Hollywood culture” that demanded innovation and adaptation, 
but whose continuing connections to the South played a critical role in 
evangelicalism’s politicization on a national scale.92 Perhaps most importantly, 
though, the fact that they, “like all other evangelicals, ...held fast to certain core 
tenets -  the primacy of individual conversion, the inerrancy and infallibility of the
92 Darren Dochuk, From Bible Belt to Sunbelt: Plain-Folk Religion. 
Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of Conservative Evangelicalism. (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 2011), xvii. Dochuk elaborates this web of 
connections, arguing that “developments within the West Coast’s evangelical 
subculture did not unfold in isolation but rather transpired within the context of an 
emerging Sunbelt. Though always present during the early cold war years, 
religious interchange between Southern California and the South gained 
importance on a national scale in the late 1960s and 1970s as preachers and 
politicians sought ways to undo the Democratic Party’s ‘Solid South.’ In this 
context of political upheaval, California precedents became pedagogy for others.” 
Bible Belt, xxi.
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Bible, and the scriptural injunction to witness for Christ” masked the flexibility of 
those beliefs to adapt to new circumstances.93 Furthermore, the central role of 
the biblical terms with which these people had long understood their realities 
allowed them to remain confident in the rightness of their causes. Dochuk 
therefore makes explicit what McGirr only occasionally and obliquely implies -  
that the terms through which these now-Californian conservative evangelicals 
understood themselves and their world infused their activities as “plain folk,” 
“preachers,” and “entrepreneurs” with spiritual weight and moral purpose.
For Dochuk, historicizing the belief system that the emigres brought with 
them from the South to Southern California is a critical prerequisite to 
understanding the increasing politicization of their faith over the last half of the 
twentieth century. The “western South,” the region from which many of the new 
Californians hailed (and which overlaps much of Moreton’s Wal-Mart country), 
had, as noted before, fostered a unique “populist Americanism” that was 
“inspired by the mythologized ideal of Thomas Jefferson’s virtuous yeoman 
farmer.”94 Furthermore, it was “the dialectic of being southern and western, of 
wanting to preserve and create, defend and advance” that “not only motivated 
them in their personal quests for fruitful lives, but led them to believe collectively
93 Ibid., xvii.
94 Ibid., 9. Dochuk identifies this western South as the culture that 
developed west of the Mississippi, “a region centered at the intersection of the 
borders of Arkansas, Texas, and Oklahoma but also extending westward along 
the Oklahoma-Texas panhandle and north-south between Missouri and 
Louisiana.” 8.
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that they and their plain-folk Americanism held the keys to a better society.”95 
Perhaps most importantly for these southern evangelicals, “Jefferson and Jesus” 
had long embraced, and “at the core of their political culture was an unwavering 
faith that conflated [these] doctrines.”96 Thus, this heritage of “Jeffersonian 
precepts [that] came wrapped in a package of Christian, plain-folk Americanisms” 
formed an “all-encompassing worldview that gave white southerners especially a 
sense of guardianship over their society” that they carried with them to California 
beginning in roughly the 1930s.97
These emigres framed their “sense of guardianship,” however, not 
primarily in political terms, but in religious ones. Dochuk revises the way 
“historians of the South have described this region’s out-migration” from the 
1930s forward “by using Old Testament allegories.”98 Historians, however, have 
wrongly portrayed these white southerners as being in “exile,” like the Israelites 
in Babylon. This, claims Dochuk, is not the biblical parallel white southerners 
would have chosen for themselves:
[These southern evangelicals] chose to say that they were on an “errand,” 
like the Apostle Paul journeying from Jerusalem to Macedonia -  and the 
Puritans from England to North America -  commissioned by God to 
evangelize the wilderness in hopes of saving it and the people they left 
behind... Confident of their religious heritage, they... envisioned
95 Ibid., 13.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid., xx.
98 Ibid., xviii.
49
themselves on a mission rather than forced egress. The choice of 
metaphor was important, for it not only enabled them intellectually, it also 
made them active participants in the seismic social transformations of the 
period."
While “southern evangelicals thus carried with them a mandate to make their 
religion count” into their new Californian context, this was simultaneously a call to 
make their politics count, too, if for no other reason than that, “in the world from 
which they came, the distinction [between religion and politics] was a false 
one.”100 Not all of southern evangelicals’ political leanings drew directly upon 
their faith. Nevertheless their sense of “errand,” combined with the tendency to 
“wrap” all ideas “in a package” of first and foremost their own unique Christian 
language, provided the impetus not just to see their world in these terms, but to 
shape their world to fit those terms as well -  a project that, in their minds, 
transcended political boundaries.101
Dochuk’s book also “examines the clash of cultural views that resulted 
from southern evangelicalism’s West Coast sojourn,” a clash whose lines were 
drawn, Dochuk argues, first in battles over organized labor between “Social
99 Ibid., xix.
100 Ibid., xviii, xix.
101 Ibid., xxii. Dochuk elaborates later, “The sense of mission that 
animated their move west only added to the righteousness of this responsibility. It 
helped these once independent farmers and townsfolk now working assembly 
lines in colossal manufacturing and defense plants to know that they were 
assisting a divine plan. This concept of Christian servitude was psychologically 
soothing, but such vivid spiritual imagination was more than a coping 
mechanism. It also served as a blueprint for civic engagement and a public 
declaration that they would not be isolated in their blue-collar suburban 
enclaves.” Ibid., 26.
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Democrats on one hand, southern evangelical populists on the other.”102 What 
appeared to many to initially be a fight between party factions, however, belied 
the deeper differences between the dramatically different lenses through which 
these two groups viewed the world. Dochuk’s argument that these “southern 
evangelical populists” became self-aware of their political potential as a group 
“first contemplated in the pew and then exercised in the community” is telling, 
and a subtle but marked difference from McGirr’s description of the order of 
those events.103 The growing contingent of Social Democrats, then, represented 
not just a political or social threat, but a spiritual threat as well, and thus, these 
new Californians, envisioning themselves not just as Christian soldiers but 
simultaneously as “American patriots” confronted with a newly-realized “enemy,” 
“needed to marshal their energy against a liberal establishment that assailed 
congregational and personal sovereignty in matters of faith as easily as it 
undermined the autonomy of neighborhood and nation state in matters of 
governance.”104 The dual threat that the liberal establishment posed clearly 
encouraged these evangelicals to consider their political roles as “American 
patriots” as deeply sacred ones as well.
The ways that McGirr and Dochuk understand the impetus for believing in 
an inherent unity behind particular parts of a political agenda and a vision of 
American identity represent two different pieces to the puzzle that is conservative 
evangelicals’ persistent claims to “own America.” Whereas McGirr insists that the
102 Ibid., xx.
103 Ibid., xx.
104 Ibid., xx-xxi.
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much of the glue between conservative ideas for suburbanites in Orange County 
derived largely from a need to justify their lifestyle and a desire for community, 
Dochuk argues that for southern evangelicals, at least, the reason that the 
amalgamation of free-market, socially conservative ideals, and evangelical 
religion appeared self-evident and essentially “American” is that the devotional 
stance of southern evangelicals toward nearly all aspects of life left little felt need 
for communal introspection.105 The all-subsuming nature of this vision of the 
“errand” bolstered the presumption that critical critique regarding the compatibility 
of assimilated ideas was unnecessary so far as those ideas could be translated 
into evangelical language.
VII. Conclusion
Who owns “America”? The politicization of evangelicalism vividly evident 
in the emergence of an identifiable “religious Right” in the late 1970s and early 
1980s is one historical moment in which the members of a particular group -  
conservative evangelicals in this case -  claimed the right to offer themselves as 
the answer. For conservative evangelicals from roughly mid-century forward, 
discussions of Christian and American identity were increasingly intertwined, and 
intertwined with the acceptance both of conservative economic and social 
policies. Conservative evangelical claims to be the rightful heirs and loyal 
defenders of the “American way” have persisted well into the twenty-first century,
105 “Theirs was not, in other words, an intellectual engagement meant to 
scrutinize the structural underpinnings of capitalism or, conversely, simply put 
one’s mind at ease with the system. It was, rather, an exercise in devotion, of 
learning how to interpret financial reward in the context of spiritual blessing and 
maximize money for advancement of Christ’s kingdom on earth.” Ibid., 183.
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in the face of persistent and quite vocal opposition. Such claims appear not just 
in political contexts but in literature directed solely at those who share the 
conservative evangelical faith. These two observations are important. 
Acknowledging them makes a strong case for arguing that conservative 
evangelicals did not just invent those claims as a matter of political expediency 
(however accurate such a judgment may be in many cases), but that they 
themselves believed those claims. If we accept that conservative evangelicals 
have sincerely believed in the absolute truth of their “Christian Americanism,” 
however, and if we also accept Foucault’s call to question “the inviolable identity” 
of any concept, we must also begin to investigate the ways and means by which 
that conflation of American identity, evangelical religion, and conservative, New 
Right politics was made to appear as “common sense” to so many.106
The works discussed in this paper put us well on our way toward 
beginning a genealogy of that process. David Sehat offers a very strong case for 
recognizing the existence of a Protestant “moral establishment” from the birth of 
the United States and into the twentieth century. Introducing theories of 
hegemony into this discussion helps to explain the moral establishment’s shift 
from an often silently coercive power to a vocally disputed ideology, an ideology 
defended by conservative evangelicals from the Cold War period to the present. 
Jonathan Herzog’s work on the deliberately and explicitly religious character of 
early Cold War tactics partially explains how a “holy war that once concerned all 
religious Americans,” from Catholics to liberal and mainstream Protestants,
106 Foucault, “Genealogy,” 142.
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became “the province, and indeed the obsession, of a fraction of them.”107 Susan 
Harding demonstrates through intensive close reading that conservative 
evangelicals’ unique understanding of the Bible as literally true has the tendency 
of bestowing the appearance of absolute truth to whatever ideas are explained in 
those biblical terms, at least to all those who speak the language. Bethany 
Moreton, Ruth Murray Brown, Lisa McGirr, and Darren Dochuk all argue for the 
important role regional context plays in clarifying our understanding of the 
reasons why certain concepts fed into the definition of evangelicals’ ideal 
“America” and others did not. Together, these four authors also demonstrate the 
commonalities across regions, particularly the way in which what Harding terms 
“fundamentalist language” helped translate ideas that resonated with largely 
white, middle class, patriarchal communities into terms more palatable to deeply 
religious populations. From Virginia to California by the 1980s, this particular 
discourse had worked to effectively mask the genealogy of the conflation of 
evangelical faith with a conservative vision of “America,” bestowing upon that 
conflation the appearance of timeless truth.
107 Herzog, Spiritual-Industrial Complex. 207.
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Chapter 2: “Saints or Censors”: Two Texans and the Art of Persuasion
I. Introduction 
In his introduction to education activists Mel and Norma Gablers’ 1985 
book, What Are They Teaching our Children?, James C. Hefley, a Southern 
Baptist freelance writer, was simply noting the obvious when he stated, “Hardly 
anyone who has heard anything about them remains neutral.”108 Hefley 
articulated this apparent lack of middle ground by stating that the Gablers, most 
clearly identifiable with the part of the conservative resurgence that became the 
religious Right, were “either hated or adored, praised or shellacked, labeled 
saints or censors.”109 This at first puzzling dualism, “saints or censors,” is 
nonetheless the key to making sense out of the Gablers’ manifesto. Given a 
cursory reading, their writing appears to be little more than a woefully- 
disorganized, self-contradictory, often-redundant fusion of polemic, appeal, and 
battle cry. Yet a close reading of their rhetoric suggests that the book’s surface 
incoherence is largely an effect of so much rhetorical static, static produced by 
the Gablers’ apparent attempt to simultaneously speak to their allies and 
persuade the unconvinced to join their side. The resulting interference masks a 
quite stable logic that runs throughout their book, a logic rooted in fundamentalist 
theological concepts regarding the nature of truth. Taken alone, the phrase 
“saints or censors” appears to be a comparison, to use the old adage, between 
apples and oranges. Yet by rhetorically crafting “saints” and “censors” as a
. 108 Mel Gabler and Norma Gabler, What Are They Teaching Our 
Children?, ed. James C. Hefley (Wheaton, IL: Victor Books, 1985), 5.
109 Ibid., 5.
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dualism, Hefley perhaps unwittingly encapsulated the character of debates 
between politically-active conservative evangelicals and many of their opponents. 
In the early 1980s in particular, proponents and opponents of religious Right 
stances often appeared to be talking past one another, an effect that I argue 
stems from the fact that the two “sides” of these debates consistently argued 
from two not so much oppositional as entirely different sets of premises, 
premises that remained largely unarticulated.
To borrow Gene Burns’ concept from The Moral Veto: Framing 
Contraception. Abortion, and Cultural Pluralism in the United States, the Gablers 
and their opponents relied upon two quite different “frames” by which to 
understand and articulate what they each believed were the proper aims of 
education, and what they believed constituted “the good” for individuals and for 
society.110 In nearly every encounter, both sides “implicitly legitimize[d] one way 
of framing” debates over public school textbooks, and “implicitly” is an important 
word.111 In their responses to the Gablers, journalists and educators alike 
presumed upon a basic level of agreement regarding the notion that education in 
the United States was and ought to be about figuring out how best to develop 
future citizens who would sustain democratic practices in a pluralistic society. 
Thus, they were befuddled by those who, like the Gablers, were similarly
110 Burns explains, “By asking how people ‘frame’ contraception or 
abortion, I mean to ask, what do they think the issue is about? For instance, is 
abortion primarily about ‘unborn children’ (as the pro-life frame would insist) or is 
it about women’s right to choose (as the pro-choice frame would insist)?” Gene 
Burns, The Moral Veto: Framing Contraception. Abortion, and Cultural Pluralism 
in the United States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 7.
111 Ibid., 7.
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presuming upon a basic level of agreement regarding their own, entirely different 
frame. They understood education as concerned first and foremost with 
children’s “proper” moral and spiritual development, towards which there was 
only ever one right avenue. Using this frame, the Gablers understood “good 
citizenship” to be less the aim of “good education” than an inevitable byproduct of 
it, achieved only when children were taught what was to them most important -  
accepting the eternally-stable absolute “truth” of what they called the “Judeo- 
Christian Bible” (as, of course, the Gablers and their fellow conservative 
evangelicals understood and applied it).112
The Gablers’ conservative evangelical religious identity (their 
understanding of themselves as “saints” -  possessors of and missionaries for a 
single, unified system of God-given truth and morality) by its very nature 
undergirded and informed their political activities as concerned U.S. citizens. The 
rhetorical strategies that the Gablers use in their 1985 book What Are They 
Teaching Our Children? suggest, however, that the couple was aware that in 
order to reach beyond those who already adhered to their faith, their goals and 
concerns would have to be translated into what Jurgen Habermas has called 
“generically accessible language.”113 In this paper, I will first examine the way in 
which the Gablers attempt to create a kind of “common ground” between their 
allies and those less convinced of the Gablers’ positions. They attempt to do so 
by appealing to the affective image of the child, asserting that children’s safety
112 Gabler and Gabler, Our Children. 160.
113 Habermas, “Political Theology,” 26.
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and well-being is the primary issue at stake in the choice between their view and 
their opponents’ view. I will then proceed to look at the ways in which the Gablers 
deploy the language of democratic citizenship (raising questions of majority 
versus minority rights, taxpayer status, and what histories and values qualify as 
truly “American”) in an effort to demonstrate that their perspective is not 
provincial, but applicable to all “true” Americans. Finally, I will identify the 
Gablers’ a priori presumptions, rooted in conservative evangelical theology, that 
appear to together comprise the linchpin of their book’s logic.
Philosopher Jonathan Glover uses the image of “a wire frame... made of 
many bits of rigid wire” to attempt to correct the erroneous idea that religious 
adherents operate within a system that is itself necessarily static.114 “You can 
choose the shape of any bit of the frame,” his analogy goes, “provided you allow 
the rest of the frame to bend and twist to accommodate it. The belief you want to 
preserve at all costs is the bit you hold rigid, letting this determine the shape of 
the rest of the frame.” 115 Following this analogy, in their efforts to persuade those 
outside of religious Right circles, the Gablers were forced to choose which “bit” of 
their “frame” they were willing to bend. Despite their attempt to speak a 
“generically accessible language,” their prioritization of their particular vision of 
“sainthood,” and the way in which they framed all issues around that implicit 
vision, was precisely what was unacceptable to their opponents and non- 
negotiable for them. The rhetorical static that results is in part what perpetuated
114 Jonathan Glover, Humanity: A Moral IHistorv of the Twentieth Century 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 266.
115 Ibid.
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the mutual frustration between opponents who both seemed incapable of ever 
“answer[ing]... objections specifically.”116
II. Background: Making New Allies 
“Mel and Norma Gabler are, without a doubt, the most publicized and 
controversial couple in American education,” Hefley claimed in his introduction.117 
At least in the first half of the 1980s, there was some truth to this claim. The 
Texas couple, long devoted to voicing their concerns about public school 
textbooks, exemplified for many in the media and academia a critical point of 
convergence, the intersection of the waves of political and religious conservatism 
whose magnitude and power, after decades of more liberal trends, caught many 
by surprise.118 Republican Ronald Reagan swept past incumbent Democrat 
Jimmy Carter in the 1980 election. Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority, founded in 
1979, was only one of a slew of similar religiously-grounded political 
organizations proliferating at this time. There was also, in historian and educator 
Diane Ravitch’s words, “a palpable sense” nationwide “that something had to
116 Gabler and Gabler, Our Children, 99.
117lbid., 5. For more on Hefley and his associations with the conservative 
takeover of the Southern Baptist Convention in 1984, see Joni B. Hannigan, 
“James C. Hefley, Author of Truth in Crisis’ Dies at 73,” Baptist Press. March 22, 
2004, http://www.bpnews.net/bpnews.asp?id=17899, (accessed May 2, 2013).
1 Sociologist Nancy Tatom Ammerman, writing at the end of the 1980s, 
recalled, “The emergence of Fundamentalism in the 1970s, seemingly from 
nowhere, caught Americans by surprise... [I]n 1980, a large bloc of religious 
people, claiming the label Fundamentalist, opposed Carter, and we were faced 
with an even more serious challenge to our assumptions about what 
Evangelicals and Fundamentalists were, where they were located, and what 
might be expected from them.” Nancy Tatom Ammerman, Bible Believers: 
Fundamentalists in the Modern World (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University 
Press, 1987), 1.
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done to improve educational standards.”119 The 1983 national report, A Nation at
Risk confirmed this sense, declaring that “the educational foundations of our 
society are presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens 
our very future as a Nation and a people.”120 This, says Dona Schneider, “was 
more than a call for reform -  it was a scream.”121 In addition, the 1970s and early 
1980s witnessed a growing and increasingly vocal concern about censorship 
from within the educational community itself.122 At the juncture of conservative 
politics, conservative religion, educational reform efforts, and elevated concerns 
regarding censorship, the Gablers suddenly found the work they had done 
relatively quietly since 1961 in the national spotlight. Newspapers from the 
Washington Post to the Los Angeles Times told the story of how these “two little 
Texans” had managed to use their state’s textbook adoption process, which 
allowed citizens to voice objections at public hearings prior to official statewide 
adoption, to eliminate “material that distorts the Constitution, encourages
119 Diane Ravitch, Left Back: A Century of Failed School Reforms (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 411.
120 National Commission on Excellence in Education, A Nation at Risk: 
The Imperative for Educational Reform. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1983), 5, http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps3244 
/ED226006.pdf (accessed January 8, 2014).
121 Dona Schneider, American Childhood: Risks and Realities (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1995), 83.
122 After the Phi Delta Kappan, for instance, published article in October
1979 looking with alarm at the proceedings of the past decade, the journal in
1980 devoted an article almost every other monthly issue to the topic of 
censorship, as opposed to one or two every other year or so in the decade prior 
to that point. An article in the April 1980 issue was the earliest I could find 
mentioning the Gablers specifically, and in 1982, the Phi Delta Kappan devoted 
the entirety of their October issue to the topic, including publishing an article by 
the Gablers themselves.
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evolutionary speculation, undermines the traditional role of the sexes and 
promotes secular humanism.”123 Because the Texas State Board of Education 
took citizens’ objections seriously, publishers had to as well, and, as one 
newspaper article explained, “Because [Texas] is one of 22 states that select 
books statewide, what passes muster here sometimes sets a nationwide 
standard.”124
Recent scholarship attempting to explain the conservative ascendancy 
that inaugurated the Reagan Era has noted the increasing interconnectedness, 
developed largely through migration, media, and communication networks, of 
people across the United States from the grassroots level and up who, like the 
Gablers, came to be identified as part of the “religious Right.”125 Daniel K. 
Williams observes that “by the summer of 1980,” old enemies had set aside their 
differences, and “the evangelical unity that had seemed impossible to imagine 
only two years earlier had become a reality. Fundamentalists, charismatics, and 
evangelicals were working together in a political coalition to take the nation back
123 Dan Balz, “Two Little Texans’ in Thick of Textbook Battle for Young 
Minds,” The Washington Post. August 16, 1982, http://search.proquest.com 
/docview/147421162?accountid=15053 (accessed January 11, 2014). According 
Balz’s article, Norma Gabler expressed incredulity at the opposition arising 
against “two little Texans,” opposition that included Norman Lear’s lobbying 
group People for the American Way and no doubt arose partly because the 
spotlight had turned on them at the dawn of the decade.
124 Ibid.
125 See Darren Dochuk’s From Bible Belt to Sunbelt for an excellent and 
engaging treatment of this intricate web of relations between South and West in 
particular.
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for the cause of Christ.”126 The interconnectedness and new sense of unity 
fostered community and simultaneously fed the inflated sense of, in Falwell’s 
terms, “majority” status that publications from religious and political conservatives 
consistently claimed. In 1982, the Gablers confidently claimed that while “fifteen 
to 20 years ago we were rather lonesome in our battle,” they were “now... only 
two of many, many concerned individuals across our nation.”127
The fact that they had acquired a much larger audience in the few years 
preceding that statement likely fed*both the reality and appearance of an 
expanding base of real and potential allies. The Gablers appear to have first hit 
national news for the supportive role they played in the explosive textbook 
controversy in Kanawha County, West Virginia in 1974. Multiple articles from that 
point forward cite the Gablers’ connections to Phyllis Schlafly, the leader of the 
anti-ERA campaign and founder of Eagle Forum, and Jerry Falwell’s Moral 
Majority. By many accounts, the Gablers’ in-home not-for-profit, Education 
Research Analysts, had a mailing list of around 12,000 people at the beginning of 
the decade.128 Their visibility increased throughout the early 1980s, as they were 
featured in national newspapers as well as on national television shows such as
126 Daniel K. Williams, God’s Own Party: The Making of the Christian Right 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 184.
127 Mel Gabler and Norma Gabler, “Response: Mind Control Through 
Textbooks,” The Phi Delta Kappan 64, no. 2 (October 1982), 96. 
http://www.jstor.org.proxy.wm.edu/stable/20386583 (accessed May 2, 2013).
128 Journalist Dena Kleiman was among several to report that the Gablers 
had “a mailing list of over 12,000 and a staff of seven.” “Influential Couple 
Scrutinizes Books for Anti-Americanism,”’ The New York Times, July 14, 1981, 
https://proxy.wm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.proxy.wm.edu/docvie 
w/120705749?accountid=15053 (accessed January 11, 2014).
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CBS’s 60 Minutes.129 The Texas couple may have rejoiced over their expanding 
base of support, but the new curiosity in the Gablers and their efforts also 
triggered deep concern among educators in particular. Expressions of this 
concern were often accompanied by outrage over what many understood not just 
as censorship efforts that were antithetical to healthy democratic society, but also 
as an attempt to undo the gains made toward expanding civil rights and 
accepting diversity that marked the decades prior. The reactions in the 
mainstream media and in educational journals also revealed, however, a 
profound befuddlement over rhetoric that appeared to them as at best logically 
inconsistent and at worst blatantly dissembling: without fail, those who, like the 
Gablers, were arguing for the removal or revision of “immoral” textbooks insisted 
that the real “censors” were elitist “educrats.”130
By 1985 a number of well-publicized court cases centering on the legality 
and constitutionality of conservative evangelicals’ concerted efforts to alter public 
education were in process, emerging in tandem with quite vocal opposition to 
such alterations by parents and educators around the country.131 In addition, the
129 Frank Piasecki’s doctoral dissertation provides an abundant 
compilation of media attention given the Gablers, which grew exponentially 
around the beginning of the decade. Frank E. Piasecki, “Norma and Mel Gabler: 
The Development and Causes of Their Involvement Concerning the Curricular 
Appropriateness of School Textbook Content” (PhD diss., North Texas State 
University, Denton, 1982).
1 Gabler, Our Children. 99.
131 Joan DelFattore has written an in-depth and passionate exploration of 
several of the most well-known court cases involving “fundamentalist ideology” 
and public school textbooks, including Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of 
Education (1987). Joan DelFattore, What Johnny Shouldn’t Read: Textbook 
Censorship in America (New Flaven: Yale University Press, 1992), 3.
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Gablers’ own efforts in Texas had come under increasingly effective opposition, 
from Norman Lear’s People for the American Way (P.F.A.W.) in particular.1321 
was unable to locate explicit evidence pointing to the Gablers’ motivation for 
publishing their book at the particular moment they did. However, the explosion 
of interest in the couple at the turn of the decade, and the accompanying 
expansion of both support and resistance, strongly suggests that they felt 
compelled to speak no longer just to the assumed “majority” who already allied 
with their cause, but to persuade the unconvinced to join their efforts and to more 
thoroughly address their opponents’ accusations.
The fact that the book was published by a religious press (Victor Press), 
contains scattered Bible quotations, and explicitly laments the fundamentalist 
“cop-out period” following the Scopes trial in 1925, suggests in part that it was 
intended for a conservative evangelical audience, an effort (to echo the Gablers’ 
own frequent use of militaristic language) to “rally the troops.”133 Yet the frequent 
shifts from the rhetorical offense to the rhetorical defense imply another goal, as 
well. After calling for the reinstatement of the nineteenth-century McGuffev
132 It appears to be largely because of P.F.A.W.’s involvement that the rule 
stating that only opposition to textbooks could be voiced at the hearings was 
changed in 1982. See Robert Reinhold, “Textbook Debate Broadens in Texas,” 
New York Times. August 3, 1983, http://search.proquest.com/docview 
/122305883?accountid=15053 (accessed January 11, 2014).
133 Following the common narrative arch describing the split in the 1940s 
between fundamentalists and their more culturally-engaged evangelical 
counterparts, the Gablers write, “It was not until after World War II that 
conservative, Bible-believing Christians realized their mistake in not having used 
their influence to affect education. During this ‘cop-out period,’ ...It became 
popular among educators to ignore God, the Bible, the supernatural, the 
traditional family, and to regard majority opinion as ‘unprogressive.’” Gabler and 
Gabler, Our Children. 30.
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Readers, for instance, the Gablers gently insist, “All we want is good literature 
with a wholesome purpose” -  a generic-enough agenda that few would be prone 
to frown upon such a desire. As if sensing, however, that what equaled “good 
literature” and “a wholesome purpose” might be the real issue of debate for their 
opponents (and that McGuffev might not pass either test for some) the Gablers 
suddenly shift gears to the defensive. “You may think our efforts simply reflect 
syrupy, moralistic, middle-class values,” they accuse their reader, quite evidently 
a different “you” than that to which their humble submission was made a moment 
earlier; “Call them whatever you like. But we guarantee that the use of better 
textbooks would improve our schools and increase the likelihood of our children 
emerging as good citizens and worthy leaders of the next generation.”134 Such 
shifts suggest that the Gablers, by directly addressing (without directly rebutting) 
the accusations of those who aligned against their efforts, hoped to convince an 
audience beyond those who shared their conservative evangelical faith and 
heritage. To do so, however, the Gablers would have to suggest that what was at 
stake in this “battle” was something for which everyone would want to fight.
III. “We Must Save Our Children”135
“Agents of the New Right are everywhere,” proclaimed a 1982 Phi Delta 
Kappan article by an alarmed and irate Ben Brodinsky.136 With an odd 
combination of echoes, both of anti-McCarthyism and of Cold War scare tactics,
134 Ibid., 95.
135 Ibid., 160.
136 Ben Brodinsky, “The New Right: The Movement and Its Impact,” The 
Phi Delta Kappan 64. no. 2 (October 1982): 91,
http://www.jstor.org.proxy.wm.edu/stable/20386581 (accessed May 2, 2013).
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Brodinsky claimed that the nefarious “New Right” was “frightening parents, 
spurring them to leaf through schoolbooks to search for a dirty word, an offensive 
paragraph,” warning his readers that “they are active on national, state, and local 
levels.”137 Brodinsky feared that a vast take-over of public education was in 
process, for “while educators’ eyes were on themselves and on the rush of 
developments in education and society,” the New Right had gathered enough 
steam to “[loose] the dogs of war against public education.”138 This was no minor 
battle, either. “The public schools in 1982 are the target of so powerful an attack 
that their very existence is in jeopardy,” Brodinsky forewarned; “Radicals of the 
New Right are working toward exactly that end, that is, the remaking of the public 
schools in the image of the New Right -  or else their destruction.”139 For 
Brodinsky, the democracy that public education was designed to sustain and 
perpetuate, the fate of the more free, more tolerant, and more critically-thinking 
American citizenry that the “the rush of developments” had aimed to create, were 
the core issues at stake in this battle.
The Gablers, in an article published as a response to Brodinsky’s, 
suggested other issues at stake. “A nation that does not teach its values to its 
youth,” they wrote, “is committing intellectual suicide.”140 For the Gablers, those 
values consisted of the promotion of “monogamous families, antihomosexuality, 
anti-abortion, American patriotism, morality, conservative views, teach of
137 Ibid., 91.
138 Ibid., 87.
139 Ibid.
140 Gabler and Gabler, “Mind Control,” 96.
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honesty, obeying laws, changing bad laws through a legal process, etc.”141 Both 
Brodinsky and the Gablers’ arguments rest on unspoken assumptions about their 
broad persuasiveness. Brodinsky assumed that his audience would agree that 
“inject[ing] into each child’s curriculum large doses of biblical material” and 
“transmitting] facts, concepts, and attitudes on the rightness of Victorian morality 
[and] free enterprise” are problematic enterprises for public educators teaching a 
diverse student population.142 The Gablers assumed that that same audience 
would agree that their list exemplified the “basic foundational values,” which they 
term “Judeo-Christian” values and ethics, “upon which our nation was founded,” 
and therefore the truly “American way” that ought to prevail in public 
education.143 The unspoken argument between Brodinsky and the Gablers, then, 
was one over the accuracy of their equations and the appropriateness of 
applying them throughout public education. Yet, as if they were aware that their 
list of values might not be a widely-shared “common ground,” the Gablers 
attempted to offer an alternative point of agreement, a technique they used again 
throughout What Are They Teaching Our Children? Not only did they, in this 
article and in their book, insist that the America’s future is at stake, the Gablers 
insisted as well that the stakes involved were ones in which “the matter of 
parental rights is basic,” and were stakes that therefore, as the title of their essay
141 Ibid
142 Brodinsky, “New Right,” 94.
143 Gabler and Gabler, “Mind Control,” 96.
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(“Mind Control Through Textbooks”) insinuates, were over the immediate well­
being of the bearers of that future -  children themselves.144
The Gablers could expect references to the vulnerability of children to be 
emotionally affective precisely because of a continuing Romantic tradition of 
viewing young people as inherently innocent and childhood as peculiarly sacred. 
Sally Shuttleworth locates the beginning of this widespread cultural 
“sacralization” of children with the “Romantic writers [who] had established a cult 
of the child,” a trend that only expanded over the next century.145 Viviana Zelizer 
writes of the emergence around the turn of the twentieth century of the 
“economically ‘worthless’ but emotionally ‘priceless’ child,” an expansion of the 
“cultural process of ‘sacralization’ of children’s lives.”146 As Richard Lowry 
suggests in his work on Lewis Hine’s child-labor photography, Progressive-era 
projects often depended heavily on the image of this “priceless” child, helping to 
establish a tradition of utilizing the affective quality of such images to emotionally, 
even if not rationally, persuade.147 We can observe the Gablers’ effort to
145 Sally Shuttleworth, The Mind of the Child: Child Development in 
Literature. Science, and Medicine. 1840-1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), 1.
146 Viviana Zelizer, Pricing the Priceless Child: The Changing Social Value 
of Children (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) 3, 11.
147 “By making the child’s body visible for inspection,” Lowry argues, “Hine 
brought into powerful conjunction two discourses -  public concerns of 
progressive reform and the personal, even intimate imaginings of modern 
childhood... his images thrust the sacred child of the late-Victorian bourgeois 
home into the glare of the public sphere as the object of social action.” Richard 
Lowry, “Lewis Hine’s Family Romance,” in The American Child, ed. Caroline 
Levander and Carol Singley (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 
2003), 186.
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implement this rhetorical strategy even in the title of their book, What Are They 
Teaching Our Children? The title directly addresses parents, appealing to their 
sense of responsibility for protecting their children. The title’s form as a question 
is vaguely ominous, the unidentified “they” threatening if only for the subject’s 
very ambiguity, the presence of the possessive “our” suggesting trespass or 
violation. The Gablers’ clear attempt to inspire outrage against “Mind Control 
Through Textbooks” (as the title of their 1982 article responding to Brodinsky 
phrases it) relies perhaps most heavily on the emotional appeal of the final word 
-  “children.” Children are in danger, their book’s front cover announces, and 
parents have a responsibility -  and a right -  to protect them.
Childhood, the Romantics and their descendants would say, is sacred, in 
the Durkheim-ian sense of something one ought to “protect and isolate.”148 It is a 
life stage that ought to be untainted by too-early introductions to the realities of 
adulthood. In their chapter “Lessons in Despair,” the Gablers begin with a 
statement that follows in this tradition. “If you think children read only bright, 
wholesome, happy poems and stories in school,” they warn, “think again.”149 This 
is, however, a chapter arguing in part against the trend toward “realism” in public 
school curricula, a trend that included the effort to recognize that schoolchildren 
did not all experience the same “reality.” A story that to others may have 
appeared to simply to describe “violence, crime and rebellion” was in the
148 Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. 
Joseph Ward Swain (1912; repr. New York: The Free Press, 1968), 56.
149 Gabler and Gabler, Our Children. 83.
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Gablers’ perception equivalent to a story that advocated those things.150 Their 
gestures toward protecting the sacred space of childhood, then, suggest an effort 
to establish a level of agreement between themselves and those uncertain of the 
validity of their dominate equation. What kind of parent wouldn’t, the Gablers 
imply, want their children’s youth to be a space kept “bright, wholesome, [and] 
happy”? If, the logic goes, the choice is only between children being “shocked 
and shaken instead of being taught the moral and cultural principles on which 
America was founded,” any reasonable parent would choose the latter.151
The Gablers’ use of the childhood-as-sacred-space trope is also evident in 
their chapter arguing against “Miseducation in Sex.”152 Expressing their concern 
about what they perceived to be inappropriate amounts and kinds of sexual 
information given to children, the Gablers appeal first to one “Dr. Rhoda Lorand, 
a respected New York clinical psychologist... who has written and studied 
extensively in the field of childhood sexuality, [and who] outlines these programs’ 
potential harms.”153 The Gablers use their interpretation of Lorand’s work to 
momentarily switch gears away from identifying the key problem as being (what 
is to them) the fact that “sex education in curriculum [sic] gives legitimacy to 
immorality.”154 Rather, they attempt to appeal to those who may not share their 
“Judeo-Christian” sense of morality -  as emphasizing sexual abstinence outside 
of heterosexual marriage -  by shifting their argument toward the way in which the
150 Ibid., 93.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid., 65.
153 Ibid., 75-76.
154 Ibid., 77.
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educational establishment views the child: “The creators of these [sex-ed] 
programs regard the child as a miniature adult and therefore present him with 
facts, concepts, and demands for self-appraisal which are not in harmony with 
the developmental levels of the child and therefore disturb normal 
development.”155 For the purposes of their argument against sex education, the 
Gablers appeal to a psychology that supports firm boundaries around the 
amounts and kinds of sexual information given children. Because, according the 
Gabler’s reasoning, children are not “miniature adults,” what people like Ben 
Brodinsky label “censorship” is really protection from “the kind of sex-ed now 
being given to our children [that] is causing far more harm than good,” if for no 
other reason than that it invades the sacred space of childhood.156
The problem, however, with “what they are teaching our children,” to 
rephrase the Gablers’ title, was for them a much more serious issue than one of 
merely age-inappropriate material. Over and over, the Gablers insist that 
educational materials that refuse to “make moral judgments over whether certain 
behavior is right or wrong,” judgments that align with the “Judeo-Ghristian ethic” 
that the Gablers describe, are inevitably encouraging what is “wrong.”157 Again, 
however, as if to express the seriousness of the battle in terms those who might 
disagree with the ethic they describe could appreciate, the Gablers repeatedly 
suggest that public schools’ failure to promote that moral ethic puts all children in
155 Ibid., 76.
156 Ibid., 79.
157 Ibid., 84.
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grave danger. In their chapter “Children Adrift,” for instance, the Gablers open 
with what they describe as a “parable” of the current state of public education:
So the children are launched in their frail little boats while their parents 
stay home with mixed feelings. Most parents -  remembering the wise 
guidance they had when setting out on their voyage of life -  trust the 
schools implicitly. But some have heard disquieting reports: the schools 
have changed; children are being poorly equipped for this voyage. 
Students are being sent on their own without maps or a compass. But 
these troubled parents cannot afford to moor their children in safer ports. 
So they must, by law, send their children to this marina and trust that all 
will be well.
The children are launched. The instructors fly overhead in 
helicopters, gauging their progress. Look, there’s little Johhny [sic], 
headed toward an underwater reef. His boat will smash! He could be 
drowned! But don’t worry, an instructor sees him and surely will wave him 
back. Wait! Has the instructor gone mad? He is telling Johnny, “Keep 
going in the direction you feel is right!”158 
One of the Gablers’ fairly reasonable operative assumptions behind this “parable” 
is that no caring parent would wish their child to be kept in a place where 
“drowning” would be all but a foregone conclusion. Nor would any reasonable, 
loving parent be expected to tolerate their child undergoing “Mental Child Abuse,” 
as one chapter, denouncing the godlessness of curricula like the controversy-
158 Ibid., 98-99.
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ridden Man. A Course of Study (MACOS), is entitled.159 The Gablers go further 
still when they quote a friend and colleague who apparently equated requiring 
children to read textbooks that did not promote the “Judeo-Christian ethic” with 
“intellectual rape.”160 Not only is public education in its current state a kind of 
violence against children, though. The Gablers argue that the lack of clear 
definitions of right and wrong in public school curricula leads to self-inflicted 
violence as well. The Gablers insist that it is “no wonder Johnny and Jane are 
confused. At home they are taught one thing, at school they are led to question 
family mores and decide their own values. Psychologically, this causes 
frustration. Is it any wonder teenage suicides have escalated?”161 The leap from 
having to “decide their own values” to “teenage suicides” may not be an intuitive 
one for most, but such highly-charged language used to describe the setting in 
which vulnerable young children spend much of their time, and the supposed 
consequences of such a setting, suggests high stakes indeed for the “battle” over 
textbook content. The rhetoric of danger and violence toward children at one 
level communicates the Gablers’ own evident belief that the stakes were very
159 Diane Ravitch explains that “controversy over [MACOS], an NSF- 
funded anthropology course used in the upper elementary grades, brought the 
entire NSF curriculum-development effort under congressional scrutiny in 1976. 
Like other new curricula, MACOS was innovative in its content, its methodology, 
and its pedagogy...As the course began to be broadly disseminated, it came 
under attack in widely scattered communities by conservative critics who 
objected to its subject matter and its cultural relativism... MACOS survived the 
criticisms and challenges, but its notoriety” signaled the end of its broad 
implementation. Diane Ravitch, The Troubled Crusade: American Education. 
1945-1980 (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 264.
160 Gabler and Gabler, Our Children. 106
161 Ibid., 154.
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high. It is also clearly calculated to incite as-yet un-persuaded parents to action, 
parents who might differ over the inherent goodness of the Gablers’ “Judeo- 
Christian ethic,” but who would not argue that protecting children was a parent’s 
responsibility and right.
A problem persists however, with the Gablers’ particular understanding of 
those parental rights. “Isn’t it about time,” they wrote in their response to Ben 
Brodinsky, “that parents regained the right to the minds of their children?”162 
Textbooks, they insist, and public education more generally, should correspond 
with the moral perspective parents wish to pass on to their children. Shelley Burtt 
reminds us, “Adult rule over children is so widespread that an effort to explain or 
justify it might seem beside the point: part of what it means to be a child is to be 
subject to the authority of adults.”163 Yet, as Burtt also points out, “there is little 
consensus in either real-world or scholarly debates concerning the nature and 
extent of such authority,” and any assertion of parental rights contains a level of 
ambiguity about the “nature and extent” of adult rule.164 The Gablers’ writing 
conveys a strong sense of parental rights being the primacy of parents’ interests 
and beliefs over the state’s and child’s. They argue repeatedly that any 
curriculum that “encouraged questioning of parental authority” or “suggested 
students form their own values, independent of the home” was a violation of their
162 Gabler and Gabler, “Mind Control,” 96.
163 Shelley Burtt, “The Proper Scope of Parental Authority: Why We Don’t 
Owe Children an ‘Open Future,”’ in Child. Family, and State, ed. Stephen 
Macedo and Iris Marion Young, (New York: New York University Press, 2003), 
243.
164 Ibid.
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rights as parents.165 The couples’ particular understanding of parental rights is 
clearly rooted in a hierarchical notion of authority, and of family authority in 
particular. This emphasis on proper order has been central to conservative 
evangelical theology, and would, therefore, be attractive primarily to those who 
already adhered to that theology.166 In a clear effort to grab the attention of an 
audience wider than those who already agreed with them, however, the Gablers 
often attempt to wrap their vision for public school education in packaging that 
would be more broadly attractive. Language drawing upon the Romantic vision of 
the child -  language that emphasizes the sacred space of childhood and 
children’s vulnerability through emotionally-charged accusations of violence and 
abuse -  peppers the Gablers’ arguments. Their gestures toward that rhetorical 
tradition, however, suggests their awareness not just of the limited appeal of their 
version of “Judeo Christian values,” but also of their emphasis upon a God- 
ordained hierarchical order that would allow them to have absolute control over 
what their children believed.
What is evident after even a brief textual analysis is that “common ground” 
available to the Gablers and their not-yet allies remained strikingly small. If
165 Gabler and Gabler, Our Children, 18.
166 “Dispensationalism,” a theory regarding end times and a core 
component of fundamentalist and subsequently conservative evangelical 
theology, “was a system that depended heavily on notions of order and 
obedience. It defined sin as ‘disorder’ and rebellion against God’s rule as a latter- 
day sign of religious apostasy and social anarchy... fundamentalists, and neo­
evangelicals as well,... had long upheld morally grounded homes as the best 
proof of their separation from the world and the last Christian line of defense 
against the inherent disorder of secular systems.” Bendroth, Fundamentalism 
and Gender, 8, 10.
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“surrendering their own flesh and blood” is what public education demanded of all 
parents, the Gablers would most likely be quite right in their assertion that few 
parents would be willing to do so.167 The problem lies in the fact that to reach 
even that level of agreement, the Gablers’ opponents would have to also accept 
a wide array of unspoken premises. These include, to name a few, that “realism” 
is equal to promoting violence and hatred, that failure to instruct children in 
parents’ understandings of right and wrong in the public school setting was 
equivalent to child abuse, and that the transmission of parents’ values was 
something to be pursued at the cost of access to knowledge and the 
development of critical thinking skills. The Gablers argued that childhood should 
be kept a sacred space by filling it with only “positive” examples and prohibiting 
access to “adult” knowledge. They insisted as well that limiting information to 
prescriptive declarations of right and wrong behavior were essential to protecting 
vulnerable children. Vulnerable children are nonetheless future adults and 
citizens. Edwin Darden states concisely the political significance of public 
education: “Children are impressionable. They are viewed by adults as the future. 
By shaping their thoughts and directing their values, the theory goes, one can 
change the world for years hence.”168 According to Dona Schneider, “childhood 
became entrenched as an American institution” after World War Two, “a postwar
167 Gabler and Gabler, Our Children. 153.
168 Edwin Darden, “Public Education, Private Faith.” American School 
Board Journal 193, no. 11 (November 2006): 44,
http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.wm.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=11&sid= 
66fd3edf-f5c6-4a55-acf5-eff602cc1a61%40sessionmgr4004&hid=4212 
(accessed February 23, 2013).
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metaphor for the idealized human nature Americans wished to see in 
themselves.”169 The problem was that what exactly constituted that “idealized 
human nature” proved to be the debate around which the Gablers and their 
opponents skirted.
IV. Claiming the “American Way”: Translation Problems
The 1980s, as noted earlier, began with intense concern over the fate of 
public education in the United States. As Diane Ravitch notes, “The nation’s 
schools were at the center of many of the social upheavals of this era... At this 
crucial moment, with schools trying (often reluctantly) to comply with the 
demands of the civil rights movement and with court decisions, along came 
pressures from the radical and countercultural movements to change the 
curriculum and the very nature off schooling.” 170 Public education was a topic of 
national concern and conversation, and citizens of all religions heard the 
message proclaimed loudly in the title of the 1983 report -  the nation, and all that 
America stood for, was at risk. To argue that one’s agenda represented an 
attempt to preserve all that America stood for, then, was a timely rhetorical move, 
and one the Gablers pursue in their book with gusto. But it was a rhetorical move 
that required deciding beforehand just what America stood for -  a matter of 
perpetual debate, but a debate in which the Gablers, if their writing is any 
indication, felt no need to join. They knew what America stood for. “Judeo- 
Christian” values were “American” values, and vice versa. The text suggests that
169 Schneider, American Childhood, 3.
170 Ravitch, Left Back, 367.
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while they were leery of depending solely on this equivalency to persuade a 
broad range of fellow Americans, the Gablers remained unwilling or unable to 
question the equation directly. As a result, their arguments in their book depend 
heavily on their efforts to use, in Habermas’ phrase again, other “generally 
accessible language” equating other, less religiously-charged concepts with the 
essence of “America.”
Educator Charles Park, writing in the election year of 1980, succinctly 
expressed what many others had silently assumed about this Cold War-era battle 
over public education:
Beyond the political rhetoric of left or right, Republican or Democrat, liberal 
or conservative, lies an arena of agreement about American education. In 
our pluralistic society we agree on the right of students to learn to think for 
themselves, to have access to information, and to respect the rights of 
others to hold alternative views. Such are the dimensions of freedom in 
our land and in our classrooms. Few nations are prepared to trust children 
to become humane, independent thinkers... As our nation renews political 
debate during this election year, we can hope for a reaffirmation of support 
for the tenets of democratic schools. A commitment to the goals of 
freedom and democracy appears to be very much in order.171
171 J. Charles Park, “The New Right: Threat to Democracy in Education,” 
Educational Leadership (November 1980): 146,
http://web. ebscohost.com. proxy.wm.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=12&sid= 
66fd3edf-f5c6-4a55-acf5-eff602cc1a61%40sessionmgr4004&hid=4212 
(accessed January 11, 2014).
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Park’s driving assumption in this passage is that the debate over public 
education will begin in an “arena of agreement” about the “tenets of democratic 
schools” in a “pluralistic society.” But the implications of this assumption are 
significant. Those who disagree with Park’s order of priorities -  that education is 
first and foremost about achieving the goals of “freedom and democracy” -  and 
his definitions of those two things are effectively disregarded as potential 
participants in the debate. In subtly-charged terms reflecting the Cold War binary 
that imagined political states as limited to either democracy or communism, 
Park’s language implies that those who do not share a “commitment to the goals 
of freedom and democracy” -  as he understood them -  are therefore anti­
democratic and therefore anti-American.
It was arguments like Park’s to which the Gablers were in part attempting 
to provide an alternative in What Are They Teaching Our Children? But the very 
ideas that comprised the “arena of agreement” Park presumed upon were 
precisely the ideas that the Gablers found unconscionable. It was the very 
insistence upon “the right of students to learn to think for themselves, to have 
access to information, and to respect the rights of others to hold alternative 
views” -  those things that were the essence of Park’s “American way” -  that 
threatened the “America” the Gablers wished to protect. “America,” the Gablers 
agree with those like Park, is about freedom, but it is freedom, or “liberty,” 
founded upon “Judeo-Christian principles,” and it must therefore be defined
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within the framework of those principles and the strict moral code that 
accompanied them.172
Throughout their book, however, the Gablers seem uncertain about which 
rhetorical tactics would be most persuasive. Indeed, they appear to recognize 
that some Americans may not hold to their version of “Judeo-Christian” religious 
principles at all, and that an argument intended to persuade more than those who 
do will require limiting their demands. “We’re not asking for in-school catechisms 
and Bible lessons,” the Gablers insist, in a clear gesture to imply that they accept 
“alterative views.”173 Nevertheless, “we do protest our children’s textbooks being 
used as channels for attacks on biblical beliefs and Judeo-Christian morals.
This,” they insist, “clearly violates the First Amendment.”174 Appealing to First 
Amendment rights, however, leaves a much smaller space for the perpetuation of 
“Judeo-Christian morals” than does arguing that those morals are the foundation 
of the American ideal, and their insistence that they don’t want “in-school 
catechisms and Bible lessons” in public schools reads as contradictory and 
perhaps disingenuous in light of their repeated argument that it is the very 
absence of those things that signals the disintegration of the “America” for which 
they advocate.
The Gablers wield a number of other rhetorical strategies that suggest an 
effort to present their textbook reform efforts in terms appealing to more than 
those who shared their vision for “America.” Forinstance, in their arguments
172 Gabler, Our Children. 33.
173 Ibid., 38.
174 Ibid., 39.
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against sex education in public schools, the Gablers address accusations of the 
partisan nature of their view. While “the sexologists and their allies in education 
would have you believe that only political and religious conservatives are against 
sex education in public schools,” according to the Gablers, this simply isn’t 
true.175 Even renowned pediatrician “Dr. Benjamin Spock,” they submit, whom 
they rightly noted “could hardly be included” among “political and religious 
conservatives,” argued that “sexual intimacy” was, at the very least, a “serious 
and spiritual matter.”176 Obviously, the Gablers implied, there was a degree of 
bipartisan solidarity about this issue that ought to help persuade those who did 
not identify as “conservatives” to rethink their stance. Reiterating common 
complaints against the public education system and echoing the concerns in A 
Nation at Risk, the Gablers also implied that their efforts countered the declining 
intellectual quality of public education curricula. The Gablers begin by expressing 
a shared concern over textbooks’ lack of intellectual rigor. “Textbooks have been 
‘dumbed down,”’ the Gablers explained. “They’ve been made less difficult 
because students can’t handle harder material.”177 The future employment of 
American children was at risk as well, but less because of “academic ineptness” 
and more because of unspecified “rotten attitudes.”178
Whatever cross-party alliance against sex-education might have existed, 
however many people agreed that public education’s intellectual quality had
175 Ibid., 77.
176 Ibid.
177 Ibid., 20.
178 Ibid., 21.
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degraded, the “generically accessible language” upon which the Gablers depend 
most heavily throughout the entirety of their book is that which directly counters 
people like Park. Park was advocating an educational system that would protect 
the pluralistic character of American society by creating space for minorities to 
express “alternative views” -  a project that would of necessity not allow majority 
opinion to close that space. The Gablers, however, prioritized citizens’ status as 
taxpayers and the rights of the majority to argue the following: “Humanism 
teaches the religion of moral relativism, because it accepts on faith the principle 
that all morals are relative. This violates, in tax-supported education, the Judeo- 
Christian moral principles of the great majority of Americans,” and is therefore 
un-American.179 Not a statement calculated to welcome in the uninitiated -  by 
default those very minorities left as of yet outside of the “majority” fold -  this 
statement nonetheless succinctly captures the thesis of their work. The violation 
of the majority view (and therefore the American one) is what truly, in the 
Gablers’ view, puts the nation at risk. The couple’s outlook for the future is a 
gloomy one. “If moral or ethical relativism continues to be taught unchecked in 
American schools,” the Gablers forewarn, “we will drift first into anarchy then into 
a totalitarianism [sic]. And we, who protest relativism in textbooks, are the ones 
who are compared to the Nazis!”180
For the Gablers, prioritizing education as a moral and spiritual enterprise 
defined as “Judeo-Christian” put them from the start outside of the “arena of
179 Ibid., 100.
180 Ibid., 103.
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agreement” assumed, by those such as Charles Park, as the common ground 
from which all arguments about public education would proceed. In order to 
engage in that conversation, then, and in a clear effort to persuade those less 
certain of America’s “Judeo-Christian” character than they, the Gablers regularly 
used terms from the democratic linguistic arsenal -  appeals to the rights of the 
majority, religious freedom, taxpayer status. Their “America” was unfortunately a 
vastly different “America” than the one Park described, one unlikely to persuade 
anyone beyond those already inclined to accept the veracity of the Gablers’ 
vision. If the debate in which they wished to participate was articulated in terms 
of “democracy” and “American values,” however, the Gablers, in order not to 
compromise their own “Judeo-Christian” perspective, would have translate that 
perspective into “generally accessible language” while (re)defining “democracy” 
and “American” values in terms that would allow them to keep the “bit of the 
frame,” to reiterate Jonathan Glover’s phrase, they were unable to bend. But 
what precise “bit of the frame” was that?
V. The Problem of Sainthood 
The Gablers, at least in their published writings, tended to avoid explicitly 
identifying themselves as religious or religiously-motivated. This was most 
certainly a decision made at least in part to try to avoid the frequent accusations 
of religious partisanship and fanaticism thrown their way. The implications of 
being understood as “education apostles of the fundamentalist right,” as one 
reporter labeled the couple, were serious, rhetorical strategies intended to point
out the u/7-representativeness of the Gablers’ views and efforts, ways to mark the
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couple as either quaint or potentially dangerous.181 Thus, the few places in which 
the Gablers do make explicit statements about their religious affiliation are 
important and revealing. According to one reporter, the Gablers were “members 
of a Baptist group called the Christian and Missionary Alliance,” and they 
understood “their textbook work in missionary terms.”182 Frank Piasecki, in a 
1982 doctoral dissertation, mentioned that “Mel Gabler simply states that 
Educational Research Analysts is operated as a faith missionary organization,” 
trusting God’s financial provision for endeavors the couple were certain that He 
sanctioned.183 These admissions suggest that the Gablers’ work might be 
fruitfully examined through the lens of a theological tradition tracing its roots back 
to the unique characteristics of early twentieth-century fundamentalism. Margaret
181 Alison Muscatine, a reporter for the Washington Post, began her article 
about these “apostles” with the following description articulating both the sense 
that the Gablers’ efforts were provincial and simultaneously ominous: “The retired 
East Texas grandparents captivated their audience of 50 -  who had paid $15 
each for a day-long seminar and a country luncheon of ham, turkey and mash 
potatoes -  with their homespun, ‘plain folk’ sermon against the evils of secular 
humanism and the absence of traditional American and Christian values in the 
schools.” Somewhat cute and homey, the imagery implies, the Gablers in 
Muscatine’s view, while successful in their “censorship” efforts elsewhere, were 
nonetheless “not likely to get a foothold in Maryland,” where their “country 
luncheon” took place. Alison Muscatine, “Couple Brings Textbook Crusade to 
Frederick.” The Washington Post. October 16, 1983, http://search.proquest.com 
/docview/147600180?accountid=15053 (accessed January 11, 2014).
182 William Trombley, “Educators Fear Rising Tide of Textbook 
Censorship.” Los Angeles Times. February 14, 1982, http://search.proquest.com 
/docview/153038034?accountid=15053 (accessed January 11, 2014).
183 “With his strong devout belief, he further indicates that God supplies all 
their needs with most contributions being received in small amounts. To his 
critics who do not believe that such could be the case, he acknowledges this 
would be a big obstacle to overcome. As no donations are guaranteed from one 
year to the next the Gablers attest that they must ‘look to the Lord for funding.’” 
Piasecki, “Gabler,” 78-79.
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Bendroth, in her landmark study Fundamentalism and Gender, observes that 
“fundamentalism emerged from a revivalist tradition.”184 Although the 
fundamentalism whose history Bendroth describes originated in the North, she 
recognizes that “its message resonated with the cultural Christianity of the 
American South,” and beginning in the 1920s the two traditions began to 
intersect and overlap, divide and reunite, both theologically and regionally, until, 
by the 1980s, it became most useful to use an umbrella term such as the one I 
prefer, “conservative evangelical.”185 Darren Dochuk argues that the phrase 
“revivalist” is an equally apt description for what he calls “southern 
evangelicalism,” as well.186 This proselytizing, mission-oriented mindset made 
those conservative evangelicals’ religious and political endeavors inseparable.187 
This history offers, then, not so much an alternative as much as a 
complementary explanation of the Gablers’ silence about their religious identity 
and motivation. For the Gablers, as for so many other southern evangelicals, 
political endeavors were not just inseparable from religious ones, however. 
Political endeavors, like every endeavor, could only be understood as at their 
core spiritual ones, to be aimed first and foremost at the perpetuation and 
spreading of the faith.
184 Bendroth, Fundamentalism and Gender, 6.
185 Ibid., 4.
186 Dochuk, Bible Belt. 17.
187 Ibid. “Driven by a sense of guardianship over their culture, and 
energized by the universal potential of personal conversion, evangelicals in the 
western South,” including Texas, “folded the teachings of Jesus and Jefferson 
[into a formula for participatory politics. Unlike evangelicals in the Deep South 
who fashioned themselves the last great bulwark of Christian democracy, they 
looked confidently upon themselves as its last great vanguard.” Ibid.
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There are at least two presuppositions behind the Gablers’ arguments that 
are clearly identifiable with conservative evangelicalism and its fundamentalist 
origins. The first is their acceptance of the equation of “facts” with “truth.” The 
second is their insistence that there is only one absolute and indisputable truth 
applicable to all areas of life, which they, as believers in the Bible, possess. The 
conflation of “fact” with “truth” is a belief rooted in the emphasis on and peculiar 
understanding of order that is so unique to fundamentalist-influenced traditions. 
Nancy Ammerman, in her study of one particular fundamentalist church, notes 
that “Believers do not like living with uncertainty. When they have a question, 
they want an answer... In contrast to the chaos of the outside world, the 
believer’s life is full of order. The ideological world in which [believers] live comes 
with a detailed and well-marked road map for living the Christian life.”188 A desire 
or valuing of order is not by itself a religiously partisan position; but the 
implications of the idea of order Ammerman describes are very much religiously 
partisan. This fundamentalist concept incorporates not just structure, but the 
assurance of knowable and stable answers -  the accessibility of absolute truth -  
and “knowing what is right and wrong, what is God’s plan and what is not, 
provides a structure that believers treasure.”189 Most importantly, understanding 
the Bible as “a detailed and well-marked road for living the Christian life” leaves 
no area of life, including politics and education, beyond the reach of those 
assured answers.
188 Nancy Ammerman, Bible Believers: Fundamentalists in the Modern
World (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1987), 41 
U9 Ibid., 42.
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Tellingly, in the Gablers’ declension narrative of public education, they 
accuse “liberal theologians” who around the turn of the twentieth century “used 
the methods of German ‘higher criticism’ to attack the authority and authenticity 
of the Bible,” of leading the country and its educators away from “American” 
values.190 This is a historical reference that not only helps confirm their 
identification with the fundamentalist movement that grew largely out of a 
reaction to German higher criticism, but also helps reveal the limited reach of 
their definition of even “Judeo-Christian” values.191 As implied throughout this 
paper, the Gablers’ use of this 1950s-era phrase to suggest a kind of religious 
lowest common denominator between them and followers of other faiths. By 
excluding “liberal theologians” (as well as Jews and Catholics, the other primary 
religious groups referenced in this phrase) from the supposedly broad swath of 
people the phrase by itself implies, however, the Gablers effectively limit the 
definition of “Judeo-Christian” to the viewpoint shared by evangelicals following in 
the fundamentalist vein.
9
We see the consequences of this limitation play out in the Gablers’ 
understanding of history in particular. Nancy Ammerman notes that the 
fundamentalist believers she studied “not only claim special knowledge about 
their own lives but also claim to understand the history and future of humankind. 
What they know about the past is that God is the author of everything, and his 
truth is unchanging... what is stable and familiar is more likely to be ‘godly’ than
190 Gabler and Gabler, Our Children. 28.
191 Ibid., 28.
87
something new and different.”192 The past is then, for the heirs of early twentieth- 
century fundamentalism, always closer to the “truth,” to the way things ought to 
be, while the present appears to. inevitably be in a state of decline. The equation 
of the “facts” of the past that are most familiar with “truth,” with all its connotations 
of moral good and stable meaning, occurs throughout the Gablers’ book, from 
the introduction to the Gabler’s book onward. James C. Hefley recounts how the 
Gablers originally became involved with the Texas textbook adoption process, 
explaining, “Mel and Norma have been concerned about textbooks since the day 
in 1961 when their sixteen-year-old son, Jim, insisted they take a look at his 
history book... Mel and Norma compared the book to older history texts and 
reached a startling conclusion: History hadn’t changed, but the publishers sure 
had changed history.”193 This passage suggests that the reality that textbooks 
had changed -  perhaps even more than what specifically had changed -  
signaled to the Gablers degeneracy. Their “conclusion” is that truth had been 
exchanged for falsehood -  “history hadn’t changed, but the publishers sure had 
changed history.”
The Gablers’ insistence that there is any sort of “absolute truth” about 
history would, of course, strike most contemporary historians as absurd. There 
are, of course, historical explanations for the roots of this quite common 
assumption that history is simply a collection of indisputable “facts,” rather than, 
what is commonly accepted among present-day historians, a narrative that is
192 Ammerman, Bible Believers, 43.
193 Gabler and Gabler, Our Children, 10.
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inevitably shaped by the “personal opinions of the writers.”194 As Jonathan 
Zimmerman persuasively argues in his examination of textbook debates 
throughout the twentieth century, while “historians have engaged in a rich 
debate” over how to interpret American history, schoolchildren have long been 
presented with a version of history that elides the debates over interpretations 
and falsely suggests that such questions were “settled... long ago.”195 Thus, for a 
couple who had themselves been through the public education system (and who 
had had no further education in institutions in which Zimmerman’s “rich debates” 
would have occurred) to retain a belief in a static and idealized sense of the 
American past should come as no surprise. Yet the equation of a (familiar) 
historical “fact” with a positive moral good is perhaps less expected, at least until 
we identify what presuppositions must be accepted to have that equation make 
sense. Charles Park was completely accurate in his articulation of “the argument” 
that many in the religious Right “advanced”: “when education is presented 
without reference to the truth as given by God, the schools in effect teach 
students to become atheists.”196 For the fundamentalists that Ammerman studied 
and for the Gablers, there simply was no such thing as a morally neutral “fact.” 
There is, for those like the Gablers, only truth or falsehood, good or evil, and 
students must have a “map” to help them navigate toward the truth.
194 Ibid., 49.
195 Jonathan Zimmerman, Whose America? Culture Wars in the Public 
Schools (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 222-223.
196 Charles Park, “Preachers, Politics, and Public Education: A Review of 
Right-Wing Pressures against Public Schooling in America,” The Phi Delta 
Kappan 61, no. 9 (May 1980): 609, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20385640 
(accessed November 7, 2013).
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The dualistic character of the fundamentalist perception of reality emerges 
in the Gablers’ regular insistence that “they are not censors or ‘book burners,’” a 
denial frequently accompanied in the same breath by their proud affirmation that 
“over the years they have had considerable success in pressuring textbook 
publishers to excise portions of books they find objectionable....”197 These 
apparently contradictory claims caused understandable confusion in the national 
press coverage of the Gablers’ efforts. Yet the Gablers’ writing suggests that this 
contradiction was in part evidence of their recognition that persuasion 
necessitates some compromise and tolerance for other views. They claimed 
repeatedly throughout What Are They Teaching Our Children? that they 
“welcome discussion -  when students are given adequate information on both 
sides. We want balance. We simply object to one-sided indoctrination to suit the 
ideology of the educational establishment.”198 On the surface this sounds fair, but 
in the context of the rest of their rhetoric, a self-contradiction again emerges. 
Their firm insistence that they are “not against intellectual inquiry” is not 
contradictory //their readers accept their obliquely-stated premise -  “intellectual 
inquiry” is only valid as long as it occurs within the framework of “biblical beliefs 
and Judeo-Christian values.”199 The key to their logic thus lies in the phrase “both 
sides” -  for the Gablers, there are only ever two choices. The choice as the 
Gablers articulate it is between a worldview rooted in a particular understanding
197 Muscatine, “Textbook Crusade.”
198 Gabler and Gabler, Our Children. 60.
199 Ibid., 100.
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of the Bible-which is fully-revealed, non-negotiable, universally-applicable 
absolute truth -  and a worldview that is rooted in anything else.
The equation of older ways of doing things with better ways of doing 
things emerges in the section headlined, “The Results of Poor Textbooks.”200 
This is the section referenced earlier that begins with concerns over intellectual 
rigor and employment preparation. It takes a rapid turn toward darker matters, 
however, when the Gablers compare two lists comparing “the top offenses of 
public school students in the 1940s” and the top offenses of students in the 
1980s.201 Around World War Two, offenses were evidently benign, consisting of 
petty violations like “talking,” “chewing gum,” and “running in the halls.”202 “Forty 
years later,” the Gablers claim, public school students ‘ “top offenses” included 
things like “rape,” and “murder,” as well “pregnancies,” “suicide,” “gang warfare,” 
and “venereal disease.”203 The racialized character of this list is obvious, 
resonating with the Gablers’ disapproval of integration in particular, disapproval 
that is evident in other areas of the book.204 Yet what is also important about 
these two lists is the way in which they illuminate the commonality the Gablers
■ j
201 The Gablers’ footnote describes this list as one gathered from “private 
research.” Ibid., 23.
202 Ibid., 21.
203 Ibid., 22.
204 Perhaps the most explicit racism comes in the Gablers’ complaints 
regarding “change” that appear to allude to busing: “Here’s how it works. The 
educational social planners map out a program -  say, to help ‘protected’ middle- 
class suburban children empathize with the lifestyles and problems of the inner 
city... The program is operating before most parents even know what’s going 
on.” Later on they ask, outraged, “Since when is a small segment of society the 
‘real’ world?” Ibid., 123, 170.
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presumed was behind all that was “wrong” with public education. Integration and 
the civil rights movement clearly rubbed them wrong, and the racist assumptions 
behind their language are undeniable. That very language and the comparison 
between the two lists suggests, though, that the Gablers would likely have found 
accusations of “racism” as incomprehensible as they found accusations of 
“censorship,” however greatly they felt the pejorative quality of both. If we take 
them at their word, then what their rhetoric reveals is that for the Gablers, the 
issue was not, in the end, about race or even about censorship. Rather, their 
rhetoric implies that they persisted in understanding and framing projects like 
integration -  a project many hailed as a long-withheld achievement of “American” 
values -  as one sign among many of a much deeper, and essentially spiritual, 
problem. While willing to nod to conversations concerned with intellectual 
development and job preparation in order to build rapport with a wider audience, 
they could not leave for long what concerned them most -  the apparent fall from 
an earlier state of innocence, a state represented by the 1940s list of offenses. 
There was for the Gablers one single trend of moral degeneracy, a fall to which 
integration contributed.
The arguments in What Are They Teaching Our Children? rest upon 
premises that derive from the tenets of twentieth century Protestant 
fundamentalism. For the Gablers, the battle over education was in its most basic 
form a battle over two simple issues -  right and wrong. “Two religions” -  and only 
two -  “are in mortal combat for the souls and futures of our children and nation. 
One reverences God and the moral values of the Judeo-Christian Bible. The
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other rejects God and the Judeo-Christian basis of the American family.”205 There 
are no other options. Furthermore, “change” is itself an echo of the Genesis Fall, 
humanity’s rejection once more of an ideal reality already revealed and known by 
those who choose to believe it. “‘Change’” the Gablers observed, “is the battle 
cry of ‘progressive’ educators. Society, they tell us, is changing. Religions, 
governments, mores and morals -  all are changing. Nothing is stable, 
permanent, eternal. No institution, idea, or loyalty ever remains static.”206 For 
many observers, such change was a positive good; for others, it was simply a 
neutral acknowledgement of reality. For the Gablers, however, the fact of change 
and the fact that it was being encouraged, were signs of a threat that cut to the 
very core of their worldview -  their belief that absolute truth existed, that it was 
eternal and all-encompassing, and that they held it in their possession. This was 
the “wire” they could not bend.
VI. Conclusion
What, finally, can the awkward tension in James C. Hefley’s phrasing, 
“saints or censors,” teach us about the particular historical moment at the 
beginning of the Reagan Era, and what can it teach us about religion and 
religious communities? The phrase is at one level purely descriptive, accurately 
assessing how the Gablers perceived their own efforts (“saints”) versus their 
opponents in the media and public education in particular understood them 
(“censors”). What Are They Teaching Our Children? is also a compilation of
205 Ibid., 160.
206 Ibid., 115.
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common religious Right reactions against “liberal” social trends. Barely-veiled 
protest against racial integration, distaste for anything smelling of “big 
government” or “Communism” (most often conflated), alarm at the growing 
visibility of and influence of “gays,” and a clear aversion to the feminist movement 
pervade their writing. Accusations of racism, McCarthyism, homophobia, and 
misogyny have hounded those on the religious Right, and with reason. However 
well-founded and even accurate those accusations, a close reading of the 
Gablers’ rhetoric suggests that those accusations and the scholarly 
investigations pursuing those threads, however profitable in other respects, do 
little to explain the reasons why the Gablers, among many others, could with 
such apparent sincerity unwaveringly persist in denying those and similar 
accusations, or at least their pejorative connotations. I argue that understanding 
key components of fundamentalist thinking illuminates the fact that what for 
others were the issues in the religious Right’s efforts to alter public education 
were important but secondary ones for the Gablers -  mere manifestations of a 
single, deeper, and essentially spiritual trend, one with potentially catastrophic 
consequences.
The singular rhetorical ineffectiveness of the Gablers’ reliance upon the
Romantic tropes of childhood, as well as their use of non-religious “generically
accessible language” to attempt to construct a common ground between
themselves and those who did not adhere to their fundamentalist version of
“Judeo-Christian values” exposes the reality that the Gablers and their opponents
disagreed at a much deeper but unarticulated level. In their engagements with
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each other, educators, journalists, and the Gablers tended to take for granted 
their own assumptions about the proper aims of education, the inherent 
goodness or badness a pluralistic society, and the appropriateness of applying 
claims of absolute truth to that society.
Winnifred Sullivan notes that “religion has proved to be not an irrational, 
private, and authoritarian premodern relic destined to fade away, but has proved 
remarkably vital and ubiquitous, refusing the place assigned it by the modern 
consciousness.”207 Fred M. Frohock argues, “It is easy to forget, within the 
comfortable landscape of social religions, that the metaphysical and the practical 
are fused in a way of life throughout many cultures, and this way of life is 
governed not by the social but by a transcendent reality, often configured as 
God.”208 Nancy Ammerman insists that for fundamentalists (and their 
conservative evangelical relations), religion “is grounded in an institution (the 
church) and in a document (the Holy Bible), both of which make the unlikely 
claim to ultimate truth. That truth, it is claimed, applies to all individuals and has 
preeminence over the claims of all other institutions.”209 Close reading Mel and 
Norma Gablers’ largest work suggests reasons why, in conflicts involving the 
religious Right, opponents have so often appeared to merely talk past each 
other. Deeply concerned about the state of affairs in the United States and in its
207 Sullivan, Impossibility. 152.
208 Fred M. Frohock, Bounded Divinities: Sacred Discourses in Pluralist 
Democracies (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 1.
209 “Fundamentalists simply do not accept either the cultural pluralism or 
the institutional differentiation that have come to be assumed in the modern 
world.” Ammerman, Bible Believers. 3.
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public educational system, yet desiring to participate in a debate whose “arena of 
agreement” presumed upon a positive valuing of diversity in its many 
manifestations, the Gablers were faced with limited options. They could either 
submit their foundational premises as the matter of debate, or they could attempt 
to, through a variety of rhetorical techniques, translate their agenda into broadly 
persuasive terms. Unfortunately, using non-fundamentalist terms alone merely 
shrouded that deeper level of potential disagreement in apparent self- 
contradictions and rhetorical confusion. As Sullivan, Frohock, and Ammerman 
suggest, the Gablers’ denial of the religiously-partisan character of their 
argument stems largely from the fact that they themselves apparently saw no 
division between, in Frohock’s terms, the “metaphysical and the practical.” Their 
anchoring presupposition regarded their possession of an absolute truth that was 
essentially American, they argued, but that, more importantly, was simply right. 
To question what was already certain was untenable, a challenge to God 
Himself, and to bring that assertion into the realm of open debate would have 
been to obliterate the foundation of the very framework that structured the 
Gablers’ entire conception of reality -  an event whose possibility would unnerve 
even the bravest.
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